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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the influence of board structure and ownership concentration 
on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. This thesis is 
motivated by the limited post-IFRSs (International Financial Reporting Standards) 
adoption intellectual capital disclosure studies carried out in a less stringent regulatory 
environment of New Zealand, and limited research addressing the determinants of the 
level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure.  
Based on an application of agency theory, cost-benefit theory and value relevance 
approach, this thesis argues that firm-specific factors are expected to have a 
significant impact on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure.  
Within the agency theory, board structure and ownership concentration mitigate 
agency costs by enhancing the monitoring function of the board over managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour, which consequently influence the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure. In addition, as New Zealand has less tough rules in relation to board 
structure and ownership concentration, it is expected that these relationships will be 
more easily identified in the New Zealand context. Second, as most of the intellectual 
capital disclosure is voluntary, this disclosure is subject to a firm’s cost-benefit 
analysis. Cost-benefit theory suggests that a firm should not fully disclose its 
information unless the benefits outweigh the costs of the disclosure. Therefore, the 
level of intellectual capital disclosure is also influenced by the factors that determine 
the costs and benefits of the disclosure. Finally, this thesis adopts the value relevance 
approach to measure the quality of the disclosure. It is expected that the factors 
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associated with the level of the disclosure also influence the value relevance of the 
intellectual capital disclosure.  
This thesis is based on a sample of 155 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange 
covering a total of 519 firm-years over the period between 1 January 2008 and 31 
August 2011. A self-developed disclosure index and multiple regression analysis are 
employed to test the hypothesised relationships.  
Overall, the results indicate that the average level of intellectual capital disclosed by 
New Zealand listed firms is low and the human capital component is the most 
frequently disclosed intellectual capital component. The results provide strong 
evidence that board structure characteristics, including board size and independence, 
have a significant positive impact on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. There 
is strong evidence for a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
the level of intellectual capital disclosure, which is robust to various types of 
intellectual capital (i.e. human, relational and structural capital). The results show 
marginal evidence that board gender diversity has a positive impact on the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure. 
In terms of the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure, only board size has a 
positive impact on the value relevance of the intellectual capital disclosure. In the 
individual component analysis, board independence is found to have a significant 
positive impact on the value relevance of the human and relational capital disclosures. 
This thesis provides the most recent evidence on the influence of board structure and 
ownership concentration on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital 
disclosure in a less stringent regulatory environment of New Zealand. These findings 
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have important implications to regulators, and assist information users in the 
interpretation of the voluntary intellectual capital disclosure.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been an increasing concern about the importance of intellectual capital in 
the process of economic value creation for modern businesses. Intellectual capital 
disclosure reveals important information for internal managers to understand the 
hidden value drivers of a business and relevant information for external investors to 
estimate the market value of a firm. However, the main issue surrounding intellectual 
capital disclosure is that there is no accounting regulation or mutually agreed 
framework for intellectual capital reporting. Therefore, a growing body of literature 
attempts to examine the factors associated with the intellectual capital disclosure. 
After several major corporate collapses in the early 2000s, it is emphasised that 
corporate governance plays a significant role in the financial reporting process of a 
firm. However, there is limited research on the influence of corporate governance on 
the level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure, especially in a less 
stringent regulatory environment of New Zealand. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the impact of board structure and ownership 
concentration on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure in the 
less stringent regulatory environment of New Zealand. 
1.1 Motivation  
The nature of firms has significantly changed since the last two decades. Tangible 
assets are becoming less unique and there is an increased demand for the knowledge-
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based investment to maintain the competitiveness of a business. According to Barney 
(1991), a sustainable competitive advantage must be rooted in some unique or 
idiosyncratic resource (e.g. patent or trademark) controlled by the firm in dynamic and 
efficient markets. Similarly, Goldfinger (1997) states that the source of economic 
value and wealth is no longer the production of material goods but the creation and 
manipulation of intangible assets. As a result, more investment will be made in human 
resource, information technology (IT), research and development (R&D) and 
advertising. Moving to a knowledge-based, technology-intensive economy does not 
only change an organisation’s investment pattern but also the way a firm is valued. In 
capital market-based accounting research, there is evidence of an increased gap 
between book and market values (e.g. Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 
1999). It is suggested that most of those differences can be explained by the 
intellectual capital that is not covered in traditional accounting framework (e.g. 
Brennan and Connell, 2000; Veltri and Silverstri, 2011). As a result of the growing 
theoretically recognised importance of intellectual capital reporting, there is a need to 
understand the intellectual capital disclosure behaviour of a firm and its value 
relevance. 
The first motivation of this thesis is the lack of empirical study addressing the factors 
associated with the level of intellectual capital disclosure. Since there is no accounting 
regulation or universally accepted accounting framework for intellectual capital 
reporting, the disclosure of this information is voluntary. Voluntary disclosure studies 
suggest that corporate governance mechanisms including board structure, ownership 
concentration and other firm-specific factors significantly affect the level of disclosure 
(e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003). However, there are only limited 
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studies extending the research to intellectual capital (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Abeysekera, 
2010; Whiting and Woodcock, 2011). The results from those studies are inconsistent 
and based on small samples, which limits the generalisability of the findings.  
Second, this thesis is further motivated by the lack of recent New Zealand research 
related to intellectual capital disclosure. New Zealand capital market has small size, 
less tough laws related to corporate governance and limited intervention in 
shareholders relations. Without too many stringent rules on board structure and 
ownership concentration of a firm, it is easier to identify the relationship between 
those factors and the level of intellectual capital disclosure within the New Zealand 
context. In addition, the recent New Zealand Equivalents to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (NZ IFRSs) adoption might alter the intellectual capital 
disclosure behaviour of New Zealand firms as NZ IFRSs contain significant changes 
related to intangible assets reporting. Consequently, there is a need for a New Zealand 
study based on the post-IFRSs adoption period sample. 
Third, there are only a few studies examining the value relevance of intellectual 
capital disclosure, especially the determinants of the value relevance of this type of 
disclosure. Value relevance is considered as one of the proxies for information quality. 
The theoretical importance of intellectual capital disclosure in capital markets has 
been well discussed (e.g. Brennan and Connell, 2000; Veltri and Silverstri, 2011). 
However, the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the association 
between intellectual capital disclosure and the market value of a firm has not been 
thoroughly investigated. Much of the literature focuses on the determinants of level of 
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intellectual capital disclosure. However, the quantity of the disclosure cannot be used 
as a proxy for the quality of information (Marston and Shrives, 1991).   
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis addresses the following two questions:  
1. Do board structure and ownership concentration have any impact on 
the level of intellectual capital disclosure? 
2. Do board structure and ownership concentration have any impact on 
the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure? 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
To address the research question, this thesis adopts Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency theory to explain the impact of board structure and ownership concentration on 
intellectual capital disclosure. Due to the separation of ownership and control, agency 
problems arise when managers behave opportunistically in the pursuit of their own 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Because of the information gap between the 
insiders and outsiders, managers can use their information advantage to exploit the 
outside shareholders. However, managers’ opportunistic behaviour and information 
asymmetries can be diminished by the increased level and improved quality of 
corporate disclosure. Prior research identifies that the board of directors and 
ownership concentration as main determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure (e.g. 
Cheng and Courtnay, 2006; Leung and Horwitz, 2004).  Board of directors is viewed 
as an important monitoring mechanism to oversight managers’ actions (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Ownership concentration determines the incentives of minority and 
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outside shareholders to collect information and monitor the insiders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In addition, at different ownership concentration levels, the agency 
problems may arise either between management and shareholders, or between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
Second, cost-benefit theory is adopted to identify the link between other non-
governance factors and intellectual capital disclosure behaviour. Since much of 
intellectual capital disclosure is voluntary, a firm will only disclose this information 
when benefits exceed costs.  The costs of disclosure consist of cost burdens and 
propriety costs (Verrecchia, 1983).  The ability of a firm to bear the costs of additional 
disclosure and the level of the propriety costs are determined by the factors such as 
firm size, industry and the type of intellectual capital information (i.e. human, 
relational and structural capital).  
The value relevance approach is employed to measure the quality of the disclosure. 
The value relevance method is one of the best methods to measure the relevance and 
reliability of the information. Capital market-based accounting researchers (e.g. Ball 
and Brown, 1968) emphasise the ability of reported accounting information to explain 
the market price of a company’s shares.  Value relevance approach is developed to 
posit the relationship between accounting information including the book value of 
equity, earnings and other information and the market value of a firm (Ohlson, 1995; 
Collins et al, 1997).  It indicates how well the reported information is related to the 
market value. As discussed above, intellectual capital is considered to be capable to 
explain the gap between the book value and the market value of a firm, and how 
corporate governance mechanisms, including board structure and ownership 
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concentration, influence the level of this disclosure. Consequently, the value relevance 
of the disclosure is also expected to be affected by those factors. 
1.4 Research methodology 
This thesis employs a sample of 155 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange  
(NZX) covering a total of 519 firm-years over the period between 1 January 2008 and 
31 August 2011. 1 January 2008 is the first date that the information based on NZ 
IFRSs can be obtained.1
The research instrument used to measure the level of intellectual capital disclosure is a 
self-constructed disclosure index, which is developed based on the definitions, 
classifications and indices developed in prior research as well as those in the New 
Zealand context. The disclosure index adopts Sveiby’s (1997) three-dimension 
intellectual capital classification – human, relational and structural capital, and selects 
items suggested in various definitions and prior research. The final disclosure index 
consists of 54 items.  Multiple regressions analysis is employed to test the hypotheses 
regarding the impact of board structure and ownership concentration on the level and 
value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. 
 The annual reports released on 31 August 2011 were the most 
recent annual reports can be collected when the data collection was completed.   
                                                          
1 The effective date of mandatory adoption of NZ IFRSs is for periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2007. Therefore the annual reports released on or after 1 January 2008 are based on the new accounting 
standards. Before this date, annual reports can be based on either the old accounting standards or NZ 
IFRSs if the firms voluntarily adopted NZ IFRSs earlier.  
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1.5 Summary of major findings 
The findings of this thesis provide a strong support for the positive influence of certain 
board structure characteristics and ownership concentration on the level and value 
relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. In terms of the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure, firms with a larger board and more independent directors are more likely to 
disclose more intellectual capital information. In addition, this thesis finds a strong 
support for the non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the level 
of disclosure. These results are not sensitive to the type of intellectual capital except 
for the structural capital. The results also provide marginal evidence that board gender 
diversity positively relates to the level of intellectual capital disclosure. 
With regard to the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure, the value 
relevance of overall intellectual capital disclosure is better for the firms with a larger 
board. This thesis does not document any evidence for the significant influence of 
other factors on the value relevance of the disclosure. However, in the individual 
intellectual capital components analysis, the results provide that board size and board 
independence positively affect the value relevance of human and relational capital 
disclosures. 
1.6 Contributions 
The findings presented in this thesis provide important contributions to the 
understanding of the level and pattern of intellectual capital disclosure and its value 
relevance. First, this thesis is the first study analysing the intellectual capital 
disclosure pattern of New Zealand listed firms in the post-IFRS adoption period.  The 
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findings provide the most recent evidence that the average level of overall intellectual 
capital disclosure is low. Second, this thesis provides evidence for the significant 
influence of board structure and ownership concentration on the level and value 
relevance of intellectual capital in a less stringent regulatory environment. Without 
any explicit regulatory intervention, the findings reveal a more direct impact of board 
structure and ownership concentration on corporate disclosure. Third, this thesis is not 
limited to the examination of the quantity (i.e. level) of the disclosure, but also the 
quality (i.e. value relevance) of the disclosure. This thesis significantly contributes to 
the literature by providing the insight into the influence of board structure and 
ownership concentration on the level and value relevance of the intellectual capital 
disclosure.  
The findings of this thesis have important implications for corporate regulators, 
accounting standards setting bodies, as well as internal and external information users. 
First, the results highlight the positive impact of certain corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. board structure and ownership concentration) on the level and value 
relevance of the voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. The implication for corporate 
regulators is that there is a need for increased strength on the corporate governance 
rules. Second, the findings indicate that intellectual capital disclosure reveals relevant 
information to internal and external decision makers. Therefore, another important 
implication is whether there should be an urgent need for detailed guidelines for 
intellectual capital reporting. Finally, although intellectual capital disclosure is 
important, information users must interpret the reported information with caution. 
Without an accounting standard framework, the reliability and relevance of the 
information should be questioned.  
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1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two discusses the 
conceptual issues surrounding intellectual capital disclosure and the characteristics of 
board structure and ownership concentration in New Zealand. Chapter three reviews 
the literature relevant to this thesis. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
development process are discussed in chapter four. Chapter five describes the sample 
selection process, study period, research instruments, model development, and the 
definition of variables used in the models. Chapter six reports the descriptive statistics 
and hypothesis testing results. This thesis concludes in chapter seven with a summary 
and discussion of the findings and an overview of the major implications, 
contributions, limitation of this thesis as well as the suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
This chapter examines the conceptual issues related to intellectual capital and 
regulation environment in respect of corporate governance in New Zealand. The first 
section discusses various definitions and classifications of intellectual capital 
developed in prior research and in accounting standards. The second section 
introduces the New Zealand corporate governance framework, and explores the main 
characteristics of board structure and ownership concentration of NZX listed entities.  
2.1 Intellectual capital 
2.1.1 Definitions and current regulations of intellectual capital 
There is no broadly accepted definition of intellectual capital (also known as 
intangible assets, intangibles or other names). It has been recognised that there is some 
confusion surrounding the definition and the scope of intellectual capital (Choong, 
2008). Various definitions have been developed by professions (accounting standards) 
and academics (literature) over the past two decades. 
Intellectual capital refers to the hidden resources that cannot be easily captured as 
tangible assets. However, “intellectual capital” is not the only term that can be used to 
describe such type of assets. Other terms such as “intangible assets”, “intangibles”, 
and “intellectual property” are also used by various researchers (Choong, 2008). 
Generally speaking, the term “intangible assets” and accounting standard definition 
are more frequently used by accounting researchers (e.g. Abdul-Shukor et al., 2008). 
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On the other hand, non-accounting researchers are more flexible with the terms and 
definitions used in their research (e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 1997 and Roos et al., 
1997).  
The main accounting standards setting bodies and accounting textbooks usually define 
intangible assets as identifiable assets, which lack of physical substance, but result 
from legal or contractual rights and are likely to produce future benefits (Di Tommaso 
et al., 2004). This definition is also widely adopted by accounting researchers. In New 
Zealand, as of 1 January 2007 (or 1 January 2005 for voluntary adoption), entities are 
required to apply NZ IFRSs. New Zealand Equivalent to International Financial 
Reporting Standard 38 Intangible Assets (NZ IAS 38) provides definition, 
classification, recognition and accounting treatment guidelines for intangible assets 
reporting as follows: 
The standards: 
(a) Defines an intangible asset as an identifiable non-monetary asset 
without physical substance; 
(b) Requires an asset to be treated as meeting the identifiability criterion 
in the definition of an intangible assets when it : 
(i) Is separable, that is capable of being separated or divided from 
the entity and sold, transferred, licensed, rented or exchanged, 
either individually or together with a related contract, asset or 
liability; or 
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(ii)  Arises from contractual or other legal rights, regardless of 
whether those rights are transferable or separable from the 
entity or from other rights and obligations. 
(c) Requires an intangible asset to be recognised if, and only if: 
(i) It is probable that the future economic benefits that are 
attributable to the asset will flow to the entity; and 
(ii) The cost of the asset can be measured reliably. 
The definition and recognition rules in NZ IAS 38 are narrow, which only focus on 
identifiable assets. Unidentifiable intangible assets such as human resource, customer 
loyalty and company reputation cannot be recognised as intangible assets under the 
standards because they are not transferable and measureable as required in the 
standards (Brennan and Connell, 2000). In other words, in accounting research, 
intangible assets only refer to identifiable assets and are subject to specific recognition 
and measurement rules in the standards.  
On the other hand, knowledge management researchers such as Sveiby (1997), 
Stewarts (1997) and Roos et al. (1997) provide a much broader view on the scope of 
intellectual capital (or intangible assets). The scope of this wider view encompasses 
all non-physical assets that contribute to the competitiveness and the value of firms. 
Therefore, both identifiable intangible assets (that are regulated by the accounting 
standards) and unidentifiable intangible assets (that are not regulated by the 
accounting standards) are included. 
13 
 
The wider approach is adopted more frequently in the knowledge management field.  
The recognition and measuring methods of intellectual capital under wider approach 
are mostly developed in universities and literature, so that they are not regulated by 
accounting standards. Although there is a large body of literature addressing the 
definition and classification of intellectual capital, a consensus on those issues has not 
been reached. As stated in Kaufmann and Schneider (2004), models developed in 
prior literature are too qualitative, and the objectives of those studies are too broad.  
Intellectual capital researchers usually choose or create their own definitions and 
classifications to conduct their studies. Despite the lack of a consensus definition, 
most definitions include terminologies such as knowledge-based assets (e.g. Brennan 
and Connell, 2000), have no physical existence but are still of value to the company 
(e.g. Edvinsson and Malone, 1997), knowledge-based resources that determine the 
competitive advantage of a firm (e.g. Ordonez de Pablos, 2003). 
The selection of terms and definitions are not the only factors that cause confusions in 
intellectual capital studies. Choong (2008) find that there is a lack of consensus on the 
definition of the term “goodwill”. For instance, in NZ IAS 38, goodwill is identified 
as a distinct type of intangible assets and has to be disclosed separately from other 
intangibles assets on the financial statements. The standard categorises goodwill into 
externally and internally generated goodwill. NZ IFRS 3 Business Combinations (NZ 
IFRS 3) deals with externally generated goodwill. Paragraph 11 of NZ IAS 38 and 
Paragraph 51 of NZ IFRS 3 describe goodwill as:  
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…an asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other 
assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually 
identified and separately recognised… 
…the excess of the cost of the business combination over the acquirer’s 
interest in the net fair value of the identifiable assets, liabilities and 
contingent liabilities recognised… 
The definition and accounting treatment of internally generated goodwill are set in NZ 
IAS 38. According to paragraph 49 of NZ IAS 38, internally generated goodwill is 
defined as “… expenditure is incurred to generated future economic benefits, but it 
does not result in the creation of an intangible asset that meets the recognition 
criteria…” The standard requires that “internally generated goodwill shall not be 
recognised as an asset” because “it is not an identifiable resource (i.e. it is not 
separable nor does it arise from contractual or other legal rights) controlled by the 
entity that can be measure reliably at cost”. 
By using the definition and measuring rules of goodwill in the accounting standards, 
accounting researchers only include externally generated goodwill as a component of 
intangible assets in their studies (e.g. Abdul-Shukor et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
some researchers do not consider goodwill disclosed in the financial statement as an 
individual component of intellectual capital because it results from business 
combinations rather than from wealth creation from knowledge-based assets. For 
example, intellectual capital disclosure studies such as Guthrie and Petty (2000) and 
Bontis (2003) do not include goodwill in the scope of their studies.  In contrast, for 
researchers who do not strictly follow the accounting standards, the meaning and 
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measurement of goodwill are more flexible. For example, Ohlson (1995) defines 
goodwill as the difference between the market value of the entity and the book value 
of the entity’s identifiable assets. Peasnell (1981) measures goodwill as the present 
value of future expected abnormal earnings. 
For New Zealand firms, the most significant impact of mandatory IFRSs adoption in 
relation to intangible assets is that internally generated goodwill cannot be recognised 
in firms’ financial statements (NZ IAS 38). Previously, there was no such prohibition 
in the old Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). This change may 
influence firms’ voluntary disclosure behaviour related to intellectual capital 
disclosure.  
While the accounting standards definition of intellectual capital is identified as a 
narrow definition and the definitions in knowledge management research are much 
wider, some definitions are developed based on an even much broader view. 
Hendriksen and van Breda (1992) suggest that cash spent on services should also be 
identified as intangible assets because they have the same nature as traditional 
intangible assets. Hendriksen and van Breda (1992) therefore distinguish intangibles 
into traditional intangibles (e.g. brand names) and deferred charges (e.g. advertising 
and pre-paid services). However, this approach is less frequently adopted by 
accounting standards setting bodies and academic researchers.  
In summary, there are no general rules for the term use when referring the assets 
without physical substance. However, “intangible assets” are more commonly 
appeared in accounting research and accounting standards, whereas “intellectual 
capital” is used more frequently in knowledge management research.  Second, 
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although there is no widely accepted definition for intellectual capital (or intangible 
assets), the common features described in most definitions include: no physical 
existence (e.g. Edvinsson and Malone, 1997), knowledge-based equity (e.g. Brennan 
and Connell, 2000), determination of a firm’s competitive advantage (e.g. Ordonez de 
Pablos, 2003). Finally, the definition and the scope of goodwill also vary depending 
on the conceptual framework adopted by the researchers. Following the knowledge 
management research (e.g. Sveiby, 1997), this thesis adopts a wide approach of 
intellectual capital that includes all knowledge-based assets being able to create 
value/competitive advantages to the firm, but excludes externally generated goodwill.  
2.1.2 Classifications of intellectual capital 
Classification provides a systematic way to measure, report, and interpret intellectual 
capital. Kaufmann and Schneider (2004), after reviewing several prior research studies, 
conclude that there is a lack of universally accepted theoretical framework for 
intellectual capital classification. A number of theories have been developed to 
categorise intellectual capital (or intangible assets). The selections of classification are 
significantly different from one study to another. For example, the accounting 
standards setting bodies classify intangible assets according to their natures and 
functions. Following the accounting regulatory frameworks, Godfrey & Koh (2001) 
categorise intangibles into: 
(1) goodwill;  
(2) R&D;  
(3) other identifiable intangible such as patents, brand-name and licences.  
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Deegan and Samkin (2011) also classify intangible assets based on the functionality. 
They split intangible assets into six major categories:  
(1) marketing-related intangible assets (e.g. trademarks, trade dress); 
(2) contract-related intangible assets (e.g. licensing, employment contracts); 
(3) customer-related intangible assets (e.g. customer lists); 
(4) artistic-related intangible assets (e.g. books); 
(5) technology-related intangible assets (e.g. computer software and mask works);  
(6) goodwill. 
In recent intellectual capital literature, some classification frameworks are more 
influential than others. For example, Sveiby’s (1997) categorisation is one of the most 
frequently adopted (or partially adopted) frameworks. Sveiby (1997) describes 
intellectual capital into three dimensions:  
(1) employee competence;  
(2) external capital;  
(3) internal capital.  
Sveiby’s (1997) frameworks are directly applied in Li et al. (2008), Bruggen et al. 
(2009), Abeysekera (2010) and others. Sveiby’s (1997) classification is renamed in 
some of these studies as (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Bruggen et al., 2009): 
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(1) human capital; 
(2) relational capital; 
(3) structural capital. 
Bukh et al. (2005) modifies the Sveiby’s classification into smaller groups:  
(1) employees; 
(2) customers; 
(3)  IT; 
(4)  processes; 
(5)  R&D; 
(6) strategic statements.  
Following the majority of intellectual capital studies, this thesis adopts Sveiby’s  
(1997) three-dimension categorisation. First, his classification is one of the most 
influential frameworks, so that the results based on this framework can be compared 
with other studies and can be replicated for other purposes. Second, the classification 
is relatively simple and complete. Finally, the framework provides better linkage 
between intellectual capital disclosures and firms’ strategies.2
                                                          
2 See section 5.2.3 for detailed discussion. 
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2.2 The nature of board structure and ownership concentration in New 
Zealand 
New Zealand has a well-established legal system and regulated accounting 
environment as other developed countries (Chay and Eleswarapu, 2001). However, it 
has its own unique features. New Zealand capital market is relatively small and with 
less tough regulations (Hossain et al., 2001). A country’s regulatory environment 
influences the characteristics of board structure and ownership concentration of the 
firms. In New Zealand, as there are less stringent corporate governance rules, the 
board and ownership structures are more likely privately arranged depending on a 
firm’s size, nature and objectives. 
2.2.1 New Zealand corporate governance system and regulations for board 
structure 
The New Zealand Exchange Limited adopted several governance-related amendments 
and incorporated the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (the Code) into the 
NZX Listing Rules in 2003 (the Rules). The amended rules are mandatory for all 
listed companies, which aim at improving board independence (and the quality of 
other corporate government mechanisms) of the listed entities. However, the Code is 
not mandatory and listed entities are required to disclose how well they have 
voluntarily complied with the Code. It focuses on setting out principles to enhance the 
investor confidence through enhanced corporate governance and accountability.  
As part of the amended rules, the minimum requirements of board size and board 
independence has been incorporated into the Rules and are mandatory standards for all 
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listed entities. The Rules define independent director as “a director who is not an 
executive officer of the issuer and who has no disqualifying relationship” (The Rule 
1.6.1). The board structure and disclosure rules include: 
3.3.1 The composition of the Board shall include the following: 
(a) The minimum number of Directors (other than alternate Directors) 
shall be three; and 
(c) The minimum number of Independent Directors shall be two or, if 
there are eight or more Directors, three or one-third (rounded down to the 
nearest whole number of Directors) of the total number of Directors, 
whichever is the greater. 
3.3.2 The Board must identify which Directors it has determined, in its 
view, to be Independent Directors. 
10.5.5 The annual report of an Issuer shall contain: 
 (j) A statement as to which of its Directors are Independent Directors and 
which of its Directors are not Independent Directors, as at the balance 
date of the Issuer. 
By complying with those rules, a firm must meet the minimum requirements of the 
board size and independence as well as disclose this information in its annual report.  
In the Code, the principle related to the quality of the board is: 
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2.4 Directors should undertake appropriate training to remain current on 
how to best perform their duties as Directors of an Issuer. 
Although the compliance of the Code is not mandatory, New Zealand listed entities 
are encouraged to disclose whether and how they have voluntarily complied with the 
Code. The disclosure rules regarding the Code compliance is presented as follows. 
Those disclosure requirements impose some pressure on firms to comply with the 
suggested practices.  
10.5.5 The annual report of an Issuer shall contain:  
 (h) A statement of any corporate governance policies, practices and 
processes, adopted or followed by the Issuer; and 
(i) A statement on whether and, if so, how the corporate governance 
principles adopted or followed by the Issuer materially differ from the 
Corporate Government Best Practice Code or a clear reference to where 
such statement may be found on the Issuer’s public website. 
Besides the Rules and the Code, the Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles 
and Guidelines (the Principles and Guidelines) issued by the Securities Commission 
of New Zealand in 2004 also aims at  providing a recommended framework for listed 
entities to set up their own corporate governance systems. According to the Principle 
and Guidelines, the purpose of the Principles and Guidelines is to improve 
transparency and efficiency in the capital markets through the high standard of 
corporate governance practices. The Principles and Guidelines contain nine principles 
with guidelines. It highlights the role of directors in establishing high standards of 
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corporate governance that the better structured corporate governance system can be 
achieved “when directors and boards implement the principles through their structures, 
processes, and actions, and demonstrate this in their public reporting and disclosure” 
(Principle and Guidelines, p. 3). In addition, the principles of the Rules are based on 
agency theory perspectives (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and therefore independent 
directors are critical to the quality of the board. Further, it has been recognised that it 
is impossible to develop the best governance model for all entities. Therefore, the 
Principle and Guidelines encourage the firms to adopt and adapt these principles to 
suit their own needs. The principle related to the suggestions of board structure is: 
Principle 2: board composition and performance (there should be a 
balance of independence, skills, knowledge, experience, and perspectives 
among directors so that the board works effectively) 
This principle provides suggestions for board independence, size and balance of skills. 
The principle suggests that the optimum number, independence and qualifications of 
directors should depend on a firm’s size, nature and complexity of its activities.  
From the above summary, it can be seen that the New Zealand regulators do not 
impose many mandatory standards in relation to the board structure except the 
minimum requirements of board size and independence for firms. Influenced by the 
British approach and similar to other Commonwealth and Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, New Zealand adopts a principle-
based approach for regulation settings. Therefore, the majority of governance rules in 
New Zealand set principles that establish guidelines for entities to establish their own 
corporate rules. However, as mentioned earlier, board size and independent related 
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rules contain some details and require limited judgement.  This is inconsistent with 
New Zealand’s principle-based approach. This might be explained by the following 
reasons. First, in the 1980’s, New Zealand started to consider the U.S. law system as 
the source of regulatory reform as the increased impact of the U.S. to the world 
economy. Unlike New Zealand, the U.S. applies the code-based approach, which 
consists of more detailed rules and requires less judgement. Second, after a number of 
serious corporate collapses in the early 2000’s, the importance of board structure 
along with the other corporate governance indicators has been recognised by corporate 
regulators. As a result, there is a need for New Zealand to enhance the strength of 
corporate governance rules. However, the overall regulation related to the board 
structure is still less stringent than the U.S. codified law. Therefore, without tough 
rules, it is assumed that the board structures of New Zealand firms are self-arranged 
depending on the specific features of individual firms. 
2.2.2 Ownership concentration  
Corporate share ownership represents the property rights an owner is entitled to. Fan 
and Wong (2002) summarise three categories of property rights attached to each share: 
control or voting right, the cash flow right and right to transfer. The value of the share, 
therefore, depends on how well its property rights are enforced. The enforcement of 
property rights of the share is affected by both individual owners and the state (Fan 
and Wong, 2002).  
At country level, following laissez-faire principle in the U.K. based law, New Zealand 
law does not intervene into private transactions unless the transactions damage the 
public safety physically and financially (Parker, 1990). For example, according to 
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Hossain et al. (2001), it is believed that New Zealand companies should have high 
ownership concentration because New Zealand does not have statutory takeover code 
like the United Kingdom (the U.K.) and Australia, and an “equal opportunity rule”, In 
addition, the New Zealand Company Law provides limited protection relating to the 
right to transfer for minority shareholders under certain situations (e.g. minority 
buyout rights).3
2.3 Summary  
  Unless there are events triggering minority protection rights, the law 
does not interfere in minority-majority shareholders relations. As a result of lack of 
state intervention, the minority-majority shareholders relation in New Zealand is 
influenced by individual arrangements. Ownership structure plays an important role as 
it affects owners’ ability and incentives of how private contracts regarding property 
rights are made and enforced (Fan and Wong, 2002). This thesis provides partial 
understanding of this relationship through examining the supply and the quality of 
voluntary intellectual capital information.  
The first section of this chapter highlights the conceptual issues surrounding the 
definition and classification of intellectual capital. There is no widely accepted 
definition and theoretical framework for intellectual capital classification for 
accounting researchers and professions. This thesis adopts a wide approach in 
knowledge management research and defines intellectual capital as knowledge-based 
assets that determine the competitiveness of the firm. Sveiby’s (1997) three-dimension 
                                                          
3 Minority buyout rights set out in section 110-115 of the Company Act 1993 (the Act). Under section 
110, shareholders can exercise minority buyout rights when they voted all their voting shares against a 
special resolution, including (and only) altering the constitution of the company to impost or remove 
restriction on its activities, approving an amalgamation and approving a “major transaction”. 
Amalgamations and major transactions are set out in section 219-226 (amalgamations) and section 129 
(major transactions) of the Act.  
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framework is chosen for intellectual capital classification. Specifically, in this thesis, 
intellectual capital is categorised into three groups: human, relational and structural 
capital. 
The second section describes the characteristic of board structure and ownership 
concentration of New Zealand listed firms. The recent corporate governance 
regulation reforms strengthen the minimum requirements regarding board size and 
board independence for New Zealand listed entities.  However, the board structures of 
New Zealand listed firms are mainly self-established according to their specific needs.  
In addition, New Zealand does not have tough laws to intervene in shareholder rights 
and minority-majority shareholders’ relationship. As a result, it is believed that the 
level of ownership concentration of New Zealand firms is the result of individual 
arrangements among shareholders.  
The next chapter reviews the prior literature on intellectual capital disclosure with the 
focus on the impact of board structure and ownership concentration on the level and 
value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the modern economy, investments in intellectual capital play an important role in 
maintaining a firm’s competitive advantage and value. Most of the substantial 
differences existing between a firm’s market and book values can be explained by the 
intellectual capital that is not recognised in company financial reports. The growing 
recognition of the importance of intellectual capital has motivated a large amount of 
research examining the various aspects of intellectual capital disclosure. This chapter 
reviews literature relevant to the level and value relevance of intellectual capital 
disclosure and the determinants associated with the level and value relevance of this 
disclosure, including board structure indicators and ownership concentration 
characteristics. An overview of the general intellectual capital literature is provided in 
section 3.1. Section 3.2 outlines various studies that examine the disclosure patterns 
and investigate the determinants of the level of intellectual capital disclosure. Section 
3.3 analyses the important roles of board structure and ownership concentration 
played in determining the level of intellectual capital disclosure. Section 3.4 
summaries studies examining the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure and 
research identifying the influence of board structure indicators and ownership 
concentration on the value relevance of intellectual capital is provided in section 3.5. 
Finally, section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of the contributions, gaps and 
limitations of the literature on intellectual capital disclosure.  
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3.1 Overview of intellectual capital literature 
Intellectual capital plays a significant role in maintaining a business’s growth, 
profitability and competitiveness in the new knowledge-based economy (St-Pierre and 
Audet, 2011). Adequate intellectual capital disclosure assists decision makers to 
identify a firm’s invisible value drivers. However, most intellectual capital 
information is voluntarily disclosed because there is a lack of sufficient regulation on 
intellectual capital reporting. As a result of the absence of accounting regulation, 
missing information on intellectual capital disclosure can lead to misallocation of 
resources for internal decision makers (Kaufmann and Schneider, 2004) and 
inadequate estimation of market value external information users (Lev and Zarowin, 
1999). Moreover, without regulations, agency costs are expected to be high in high-
technology (high-tech) firms because of the inherent uncertainty of intellectual capital 
(Alves and Martins, 2010). Agency problems can be mitigated through greater and 
better corporate disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it is important to 
understand corporate intellectual capital disclosure behaviour and the potential factors 
associated with the level and the quality of this disclosure.  
Since the development of intellectual capital in the early 1990’s, most research  
studies, both theoretical and empirical, have attempted to understand the intellectual 
capital disclosure from different perspectives. Early studies focus on defining, 
classifying and measuring intellectual capital (e.g. Hendriksen and van Breda, 1992; 
Roos et al., 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 1997). Those studies provide essential 
conceptual frameworks for later empirical research.4
                                                          
4 These frameworks have been discussed in section 2.1. 
 There is a decreasing number of 
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theoretical research studies addressing the definition and classification issues in later 
research. However, as the continuous development of the understanding of accounting, 
a limited number of literature attempts to update the extent of intellectual capital from 
traditional understanding. For example, Claver-Cortes et al. (2007) argue that the 
environmental capital should be part of overall intellectual capital. In their study, a 
theoretical conceptual framework has been created to analyse corporate environmental 
information. There are not yet empirical studies investigating environmental 
intellectual capital.    
The focuses of recent intellectual capital studies have moved from theoretical 
discussion to empirical study. In an attempt to understand intellectual capital 
disclosure behaviour, there is a variety of empirical research examining the level of 
corporate intellectual capital disclosure and investigating the determination of the 
level of disclosure.5 To determine the quality of the disclosure, some research focuses 
on testing its value relevance.6 It is argued that the potential problems due to the lack 
of accounting regulations can be mitigated through the enhanced corporate regulation. 
Most research emphasises the role of board structure and ownership concentration in 
the financial reporting process of a firm. Consequently, the level and the quality of 
intellectual capital disclosure can be improved by controlling the potential factors 
associated with this disclosure.7
                                                          
5 See section 3.2 for detailed discussion. 
 
6 See section 3.4 for detailed discussion. 
7 The influence of board structure and ownership concentration is discussed in more details in sections 
3.3 (the level of disclosure) and 3.5 (the value relevance of disclosure). 
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3.2 The level of intellectual capital disclosure 
There is a variety of literature examining the level and the extent of intellectual capital 
on corporate annual reports. One subset of studies in this research category are 
country-specific research, which involve companies in Australia (Guthrie and Petty, 
2000), Bangladesh (Nurunnabi et al., 2011), Canada (Bontis, 2003), Kenya 
(Abeysekera, 2010), India (Singh and Kansal, 2011), and Spain (Martin de Castro and 
Lopez Saez, 2008). Among these studies, it can be concluded that the average levels 
of intellectual capital disclosure around the world are low. Guthrie and Petty (2000, p. 
248-249) have detailed examination of the contents in 20 largest Australian companies’ 
annual reports and find that “the key components of intellectual capital are not 
reported within a consistent framework when report at all” and “there is no established 
and mutually agreed framework for reporting intellectual capital by large Australian 
companies and the accounting profession”. In addition, the study shows that only a 
few enterprises attempt to measure and externally report intellectual capital 
information.  
Consistent with Guthrie and Petty (2000), Bontis (2003), who conducts a similar study 
but on a larger sample size, analyses intellectual capital on the annual reports of 
10,000 Canadian corporations and observes that only limited voluntary information 
has been disclosed. Bontis (2003, p.16) state that despite the global growing 
understanding and theoretical recognised importance of the concept, evidence shows 
that intellectual capital disclosure issue is “just academic discussion” and not “at all 
that intellectual capital disclosure has garnered any traction” in accounting practices. 
Further, the average levels of disclosure for firms in developing countries appear to be 
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lower than that in developed countries. It has been found that firms in Bangladesh fail 
to disclose many important items such as patents, trademark and copyrights 
(Nurunnabi et al., 2011), whereas in developed countries (e.g. Australia and Canada), 
intellectual property is the most frequently disclosed items (Guthrie and Petty 2000; 
Bontis, 2003). 
Some studies focus on the disclosure patterns for firms in specific industries. Pike et al. 
(2002) suggest that intellectual capital have a significant impact on enterprises 
valuation for companies such as high-tech and professional service firms. Following 
Pike et al. (2002), industry-specific empirical studies target at high-tech industries as a 
whole (e.g. Martin de Castro and Lopez Saez, 2008), biotechnology companies (White 
et al., 2010), pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Singh and Kansalv, 2011), and 
telecommunications (e.g. Gerpott et al., 2008). Singh and Kansalv (2011) investigate 
the voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in top 20 listed pharmaceutical companies 
in India and find that the level of intellectual capital disclosure is low, narrative and 
varying significantly among companies. Most of those studies apply Sveiby’s (1997) 
three-dimension framework (human, relational and structural capital) and compare the 
disclosure levels in each category. Martin de Castro and Lopez Saez (2008) test the 
intellectual capital disclosed by high-tech firms in Spain and find that human capital 
appears as the most influential components, followed by structural capital and 
relational capital. However, Gerpott et al. (2008), who conduct their studies based on 
telecommunication firms, document that relational capital such as customers, 
suppliers and investors have the highest disclosure frequency.  
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While much of research focuses on country-specific or industry-specific studies, a few 
studies contribute the existing literature by providing comparisons of disclosure 
patterns between two groups (e.g. Kianto et al., 2010; White et al., 2010). Kianto et al. 
(2010) compare disclosure levels between service-oriented and product-oriented 
companies, whereas White et al., (2010) analyse differences in disclosure patterns for 
biotechnology companies in Australia and the U.K. Both studies demonstrate that the 
nature and extent of intellectual capital disclosure significantly associate with industry 
and country effects. This may explain the various disclosure patterns observed in 
previous research.  
As there is no regulation of intellectual capital reporting around the world, much of 
research has been conduct to find significant factors that affect the level of intellectual 
capital disclosure. Studies follow the same process as the research on the 
determination of voluntary disclosures. Therefore, factors that affect the voluntary 
disclosure are likely to have similar effects on intellectual capital disclosure. Two 
main theories provide fundamental frameworks to structure those studies. Cost-benefit 
theory suggests that the main factor determining the corporate disclosure policy is that 
the benefits associated with the disclosure must outweigh its costs. Research based on 
this theory suggests that the costs and benefits of the disclosure are determined by 
firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, performance, leverage, listing status 
and others (e.g. Garcia-Meca et al. ,2005; Sonnier et al., 2007; Bruggen et al., 2009; 
White et al., 2010 and Whiting and Woodcock, 2011). On the other hand, researchers 
that argue based on the agency theory suggest that corporate governance mechanisms 
such as board structure and ownership concentration have a significant impact on 
corporate disclosure policies (e.g. Abeysekera, 2010; Singh et al., 2008; Hidalgo et al., 
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2011). Those studies also include non-corporate governance firm-specific 
characteristics in their models, but only as control variables. 
Some studies tests less common factors that potentially influence the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure. In a Spanish study, Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) include a 
number of less frequently tested factors such as market to book ratio, political 
visibility and the nature of the firm’s presentation.   This study provides evidence that 
market-to-book ratio is associated with the level of disclosure. This result is consistent 
with the argument that intellectual capital contributes to the gap between book and 
market values. Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) state that firms with hidden intangible values 
need to disclose a wider range of voluntary non-financial information because of the 
information asymmetry existed between managers and investors. Their study also 
finds that intellectual capital is commonly disclosed in company presentations rather 
than result presentations.  Political visibility, however, is not significant for Spanish 
listed companies.  
While much of literature uses single measurement for each factor, Sonnier et al. (2007) 
examine the influence of two types of performance measurement namely Net Income 
(NI) and Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortisation (EBITDA) 
on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. They document that tests conducted in 
different measurement methods show different relations to the level of intellectual 
capital disclosure. 
In summary, there is no generally accepted reporting framework for intellectual 
capital reporting. Researchers develop their own methods to measure and identify the 
level and extent of intellectual capital disclosure.  Previous research finds that 
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intellectual capital disclosure has narrative nature and the concept has not been widely 
applied in corporate practices. In addition, the patterns of this disclosure are 
significantly associated with country and industry effects. Therefore, the results from 
prior research need to be interpreted with caution because the findings vary depending 
on the sample selection and measurement methods. 
3.3 Board structure, ownership concentration and the level of intellectual 
capital disclosure 
After a number of serious corporate collapses in the early 2000’s, the importance of 
corporate governance in financial reporting process has been emphasised by both 
academic researchers and corporate regulators.  Consequently, there is an increasing 
in the number of research investigating the effects of corporate governance on the 
corporate disclosure in annual reports. Agency theory is one of the main theoretical 
perspectives adopted in the corporate governance and corporate disclosure studies. 
The theory suggests that corporate governance plays an important role in shareholder 
value protection, especially for protecting outsider investors from the expropriation by 
the insiders (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Board structure and ownership concentration have been identified as two of the most 
important corporate governance mechanisms to determine the efficiency of 
monitoring function of the board over a company’s top management. Prior corporate 
governance literature argues that a well-structured board and an optimal ownership 
concentration level provide more efficient mechanisms for outsiders to monitor the 
operation of insiders, and thus reduces agency problems raised as a result of the 
separation between ownership and control. Most of the board structure and disclosure 
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literature tends to focus on the influence of a single factor or the combination of board 
size, independence and chief executive officer-board chairperson duality  (CEO 
duality) on the level of corporate disclosure.  
Fama (1980) suggests that the main determinant of the board as an effective monitor 
of managers’ opportunistic behaviour is the balance of insider and outsider individuals 
on the board. Internal managers provide valuable firm-specific information, which 
assist the top decision makings, whereas outsiders act as arbiters who monitor 
important decisions and ratify decisions when serious agency problems are involved 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Following the theoretical arguments made by Fama (1980) 
and Fama and Jensen (1983), numbers of empirical studies examine the relationship 
between board structure characteristics and a variety of corporate disclosure.  
Forker (1992) and Chen and Jaggi (2000) find empirical evidence to support the 
positive relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and corporate 
disclosure. Forker (1992), as one of the earlier studies, tests the relationship between 
board composition and share option disclosures, whereas Chen and Jaggi (2000) focus 
on the mandatory disclosures.  
Much of the later disclosure studies focus on voluntary disclosure because it is 
assumed that companies have complied with the mandatory requirements. Inconsistent 
with Forker (1992) and Chen and Jaggi (2000), Ho and Wong (2001) and Eng and 
Mak (2003) find no evidence to support Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Both studies examine the influence of non-executive directors on voluntary disclosure 
in the Asian capital markets. Ho and Wong (2001) investigate the impact of a series of 
board structure indicators including the proportion of independent non-executive 
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directors, existence of dominant personalities and proportion of family members on 
the board on the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong. Eng and Mak (2003) 
test the relationship between the proportion of outside directors and the level of 
voluntary disclosure for listed firms on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. Ho and 
Wong (2011) do not find evidence that board independence and CEO duality are 
significantly related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) 
document a negative relationship between board independence and the level of 
disclosure. However, a later study conducted by Cheng and Courtnay (2006) who 
examine the same capital market as Eng and Mak (2003) find a positive association 
between the proportion of  independent directors and voluntary disclosure. Cheng and 
Courtnay (2006) suggest that the results in Eng and Mak (2003) might by driven by 
the inclusion of grey directors, which are commonly excluded from independent 
directors in most studies.  
Besides board size, independence and CEO duality, additional factors are also 
included depending on the specific characteristic of the selected capital markets. For 
example, Ho and Wong (2001) extend the prior research by including the proportion 
of family members on board when studying the Hong Kong capital market because 
most Hong Kong listed firms are family owned. They observe that the percentage of 
family members on board is significantly correlated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. As the development of the literature, other aspects of board factors have 
also been introduced. For instance, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) conduct additional tests 
on whether stock option plans as directors’ remuneration is associated with voluntary 
disclosure and find evidence that the establishment of stock option plans have a 
significant impact on the level of voluntary disclosure.  
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Similar to board structure, ownership concentration is another frequently investigated 
corporate governance indicator in disclosure studies. Voluntary disclosure studies 
such as Mitchell et al. (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Leung and 
Horwitz (2004) employee a variety of ownership structure measures to study the 
association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure. 
Mitchell et al. (1995) investigate the extent to which voluntary segment disclosure is 
related to ownership concentration along with other firm-specific characteristics. They 
find some support for the inverse relation between ownership concentration and the 
level of disclosure.  Similarly, Chau and Gray (2002) study the relationship between 
ownership concentration and family ownership and voluntary disclosure for both 
Hong Kong and Singapore companies. The study finds that wider ownership is 
positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure, and family-controlled 
companies have little motivation to disclose voluntary information.   
Instead of examining the effect of ownership concentration, Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Leung and Horwitz (2004) investigate the relationship between a series of ownership 
types such as managerial ownership, blockholder ownership and government 
ownership, and voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) observe that lower 
managerial ownership is associated with greater voluntary disclosure, whereas 
governance ownership is positively related to the level of disclosure. This study does 
not find strong evidence that blockholder ownership is related to voluntary disclosure. 
This finding is different from the results documented in Leung and Horwitz (2004), 
which only examine the relationship between a single ownership type of director 
ownership and voluntary disclosure for Hong Kong companies. Leung and Horwitz 
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(2004) find a non-linear relationship between director ownership and voluntary 
segment disclosure that director ownership is positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure at lower level (below 25%) but the relationship becomes negative when 
director shareholding is high. 
Following Eng and Mak (2003) and Leung and Horwitz (2004), in a recent New 
Zealand studies, Jiang and Habib (2009) examine the influence of different categories 
of ownership types on corporate voluntary disclosure practices. Four types of 
ownership structure are tested: financial institution, governmental, managerial and 
other company ownership. Similar to Leung and Horwitz (2004), Jiang and Habib 
(2009) hypothesise a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
voluntary disclosure. The result shows that different types of ownership concentration 
affect corporate disclosure in various ways. Financial institution ownership has a 
negative (positive) impact on corporate disclosure at high (low) ownership 
concentration levels, whereas governmental and managerial ownership influence 
positively (negatively) on voluntary disclosure at high (low) ownership concentration 
levels. 
As the development of the concept of intellectual capital, a branch of voluntary 
disclosure and corporate governance research tends on investigating the impact of 
corporate governance indicators on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. Similar 
to general voluntary disclosure studies, it has been found that board structure and 
ownership concentration are the major corporate governance mechanisms associated 
with the intellectual capital disclosure (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Abeysekera, 2010; Hidalgo 
et al., 2011; Whiting and Woodcock, 2011). The sample companies in those studies 
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include both developing capital markets such as Kenyan (Abeysekera, 2010) and 
Mexican (Hidalgo et al., 2010), and more regulated stock markets including the U.K. 
(Li et al., 2008) and Australia (Whiting and Woodcock, 2011).   
The evidence on the relation between board structure, ownership concentration and 
intellectual capital disclosure are mixed. Abeysekera (2010) only examines the effect 
of board size on intellectual capital disclosure for Kenyan companies. The result 
indicates that companies with a larger board tend to disclose more human capital 
resources. Hidalgo et al. (2011) conduct a series of hypotheses and conclude that 
board size is significantly positively related to the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure, but increase in institutional investor shareholding hinders the level of this 
disclosure for Mexican companies. Similar to Leung and Horwitz (2004), Hidalgo et 
al. (2011) extend the analysis to test the non-linear relationship between board size 
and intellectual capital disclosure and confirm this relationship with empirical 
evidence. Li et al. (2008) investigate both board structure and ownership 
concentration indicators including the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors, CEO duality, ownership concentration, and find that the proportion of 
independent directors is positively related to intellectual capital disclosure, share 
concentration is negatively associated with the disclosure and no evidence shows that 
role duality have any impact on intellectual capital disclosure. Whiting and Woodcock 
(2011) conduct an Australian studies and find ownership concentration is not 
significant correlated with the intellectual capital disclosure.  
Those studies have made specific contributions to the literature. First, instead of one 
measurement, Li et al. (2008) use three dimensions to measure the level of intellectual 
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capital disclosure. This measurement method overcomes the limitations of using a 
single factor to determine the level of intellectual capital. Further, Abeysekera (2010) 
provides detailed analysis of how individual intellectual capital components such as 
human capital have been influenced by corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, 
Whiting and Woodcock (2011) is the first Australian study to investigate a large 
number of firm-specific factors and intellectual capital disclosure for a diverse group 
of industries. 
While much of research examines disclosure in annual reports, Singh and van der 
Zahn (2008) gain insight into the intellectual capital disclosure in the resource other 
than annual reports. They study the determination of intellectual capital disclosure in 
prospectuses of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Singapore Stock Exchange between 
1997 and 2006. However, the study does not find any significant effect of adopting 
good board structure practices on intellectual capital disclosure prospectuses of IPOs.  
Because intellectual capital is a relatively newly developed concept, there has been 
only limited research further addressing the effect of board structure and ownership 
concentration on intellectual capital disclosure. In addition, the conclusions drawn 
from most of intellectual capital studies are from relatively small samples. For 
example, Li et al (2008) examine 100 U.K. listed firms. Abeysekera’s (2010) study is 
based on top 26 of the 52 Kenyan listed firms. Whiting and Woodcock (2011) use one 
year annual reports from 70 Australian publicly listed firms. Moreover, most of those 
studies are based on pre-IFRSs adoption data or do not consider the effects of the 
IFRSs adoption on the intellectual capital disclosure. Even though the IFRSs do not 
specifically address the issues of intellectual capital disclosure, the changes in 
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intangible accounting may influence the pattern of intellectual capital disclosure. 
Finally, the majority indicators used in board structure are limited to board size, 
independence and CEO duality. Other measures for board characteristics such as 
board experts and gender diversity are less frequently considered in the literature. This 
thesis only reviews board structure and ownership concentration research. Other 
factors associated with intellectual capital disclosure are not within the scope of this 
review. 
3.4 The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure 
Value relevance is one of the indicators for the quality of information.  It measures the 
extent to which information will map onto the market value of equity.  As the modern 
economy began to develop, it has been found that there was a significant decrease in 
the usefulness of corporate reported financial information to the information users. 
Lev and Zarowin (1999) document that the association between reported earnings and 
stock returns experienced a dramatic decrease between the 1950’s and 1980’s. They 
argue that the growing importance of intangible assets to the business could be a 
significant factor driving the gap between book value and market value. Following 
Lev and Zarowin (1999), Francis and Schipper (1999) observe a similar result of a 
decline in value relevance of accounting information over time. In addition, Francis 
and Schipper (1999) also find that the explanation power of the reported accounting 
information on market valuation is significantly higher for low-technology (low-tech) 
firms than for high-tech firms. Therefore, it is suggested that there is a need for a more 
comprehensive, more reliable and more relevant framework on intangibles reporting 
(Lev and Zarowin, 1999). 
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There is a variety of value relevance of intangibles studies investigating how well the 
reported intangibles information is related to the market value. Much of the literature 
focuses on the value relevance of quantitative information of a single item. Intangible 
asset items such as R&D (e.g. Ben-Zion, 1984; Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; Nekhili et al., 2010 and others), advertising and brands (e.g. Jose et 
al., 1986; Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Smiddy, 1993) and computer system (e.g. 
Aboody and Lev, 1998) are considered as main drivers to the differences between 
reported information and market value.  
R&D is identified as one of the most significant indicators of innovation in the 
modern economy. Consequently, it is the earliest and most frequently examined item. 
As one of the earliest studies, Ben-Zion (1984) provides early evidence that the 
difference between market value and book value is correlated with R&D expenditure. 
Because R&D can be either capitalised or expensed, a number of studies examine the 
value relevance of R&D reported under different accounting choices. For example, 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) find evidence that capitalisation of R&D costs is positively 
associated with stock prices and returns.  Chauvin and Hirschey (1993), on the other 
hand, document that R&D expenditures are positively related to market value of firm. 
More recently, Nekhili et al (2010), based on the conclusions from previous research 
that R&D expenditures (e.g. Chan et al., 2001; Hall & Oriani, 2006) and voluntary 
information (e.g. Haggard et al., 2008; Hassan et al., 2009) lead to higher market 
value, they construct their own hypotheses and confirm that better R&D voluntary 
disclosure has a positive impact on firm’s market value by examining 85 French listed 
firms over the period from 2000 to 2004. 
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Jose et al. (1986) and Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) examine how well adverting 
expenditures are related to a firm’s market value. Advertising is aimed at increasing 
the stock of an organisation’s intangible assets such as brand equity or customer 
loyalty (White and Miles, 1996). Therefore, advertising expense should be value 
relevant to firm’s future performance. Jose et al. (1986) only find limited evidence 
that promotion (advertising) has impacted the value of the firm. Chauvin and Hirschey 
(1993), on the other hand, provide evidence that advertising expenditures have large, 
positive and consistent influence on the market value of the firm. Similarly, Smiddy 
(1983) argue that brand cannot be ignored as an asset as it creates long-term profits.  
In addition, Smiddy (1983) state that most managers consider brands as one of the 
most relevant determinants of market value of a firm. However, there is a lack of 
empirical studies relating the association between brands and a firm’s market value. 
Aboody and Lev (1998) is one of a few papers addressing the value relevance of the 
information technology disclosure. Aboody and Lev (1998) examine a sample of 163 
firms during the period of 1987 to 1995 and find a positive association between 
capitalised development costs and returns and future earnings. However, the lack of 
research on this subject limits the scope of interpretation of results in Aboody and Lev 
(1998). 
Unlike above studies that focus on single items, Abdul-Shukor et al. (2008) extend the 
enquiry by investigating the value relevance of non-current intangibles in different 
economic conditions and accounting environments. Inconsistent with prior studies, 
Abdul-Shukor et al. (2008) find that reported non-current intangibles is negatively 
associated with firm share prices for Malaysian listed firms during the financial crisis 
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period from 1997 to 1998. Although the findings are unexpected, they argue that the 
results are not surprising as it is consistent with the theory that intangibles reflect 
uncertain expected future cash flows. In addition, Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2006) 
also find that capitalised R&D costs are significantly and negatively associated with 
stock prices and returns for French listed companies.  
Up to this point, much of the literature focuses on identifiable intangible assets only. 
In other words, only the intangible assets that can be quantified have been  
investigated. There is limited literature examining the value relevance of non-
identifiable intangible assets (or intellectual capital). Unlike identifiable intangible 
asset items, there is no accounting reporting framework for those items and they can 
only be disclosed in narrative terms.  One of the earliest studies, Amir and Lev (1996) 
argue that the financial information is of limited value to investors in a fast-changing 
and technology-based industry. They find that financial information combined with 
non-financial information contributes to the explanation of stock prices and non-
financial information is more informative for science-based, high-growth sectors. 
However, this study only examines some randomly selected non-financial intangibles. 
 More recently, Nekhili et al. (2010) and Veltri and Silvestri (2011) use a self-
developed disclosure index to test the value relevance of non-quantitative intangible 
assets/intellectual capital disclosure. Nekhili et al., (2010) focus on R&D disclosure 
only, whereas Veltri and Silverstri (2011) examine the relationship between 
intellectual capital disclosure and market price for Italian listed firms. The study 
proves that human capital is more value relevant to investors than structural capital 
information, and human capital turns to be more efficient when it inter-relates with 
44 
 
other intellectual capital components. The result is consistent with Sveiby (1997) that 
people are fundamental capital of a firm as only people can create external and 
internal structures.  Vafaei et al. (2011) examine value relevance of intellectual capital 
disclosure. Based on a content analysis of the text in annual reports sampled from 
listed companies in Britain, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore, they find that the 
disclosure is positively associated with the market price of companies in two of the 
four countries (Britain and Hong Kong). However, Maditinos et al. (2011) investigate 
the impact of intellectual capital on firms’ market value and financial performance for 
Greek companies and they do not find strong evidence to support their expectation. 
While majority of literature examines the relationship between reported information 
and market value under stable political settings, Abdul-Shukor et al. (2008) and 
Abeysekera (2011) propose that macroeconomic factors may intervene into book to 
market value relationship. Abdul-Shukor et al. (2008) find evidence that the book to 
market value relationship is different in financial crisis and non-financial crisis period. 
Abeysekera (2011) compares the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure 
and market value in two unstable political periods: civil war period and temporary 
truce period.  The study finds that even though investors do not include intellectual 
capital information in the valuation process in both periods, the investors become 
somewhat optimistic about future prospects of firms due to less stress imposed by the 
political environment in the temporary truce period.  
 In a New Zealand study, Whiting and Miller (2008) conduct content analysis of 70 
publicly listed firms and investigate the relationship between the level of hidden value 
and the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital. The study measures hidden value 
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as the difference between market value and book value and find positive relationship 
between hidden value and the level of intellectual capital disclosure. The results are 
based on pre-IFRSs adoption sample. Considering the adoption of IFRSs in New 
Zealand may have some influence on the intellectual capital disclosure of the firm, 
this relationship might be altered in the post- IFRS adoption period.  
3.5 Board structure, ownership concentration and the value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure 
A stream of value relevance research attempts to determine the factors that may 
influence the quality of accounting information. It is suggested that one of the positive 
impacts of adopting good corporate governance practices is to improve the quality of 
accounting information. Therefore, this study is build on the literature that examining 
the effects of corporate governance mechanisms such as board structure and 
ownership concentration on the value relevance of reported accounting information. 
Beeker and Brown (2006) find evidence that better-governed firms do make more 
informative disclosure by examining corporate disclosures of top 250 Australian  
firms. The corporate governance score is based on the quality of the board and its 
principal committees. However, this study uses secondary resource for corporate 
governance ranking and it does not test how good governance structure was defined.  
In a recent Australian study, Habib and Azim (2008) examine the relationship 
between corporate governance structure and the value relevance of accounting 
information. They test two types of quantitative information: book value of equity and 
earnings. With regard to corporate governance mechanisms, this study focuses on a 
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series of board structure and audit committee indicators, excluding the factors that are 
irrelevant in the Australian context.  Consistent with Beeker and Brown (2006), the 
study finds evidence that better corporate governance structures improve the value 
relevance of accounting information.  
However, there are a number of empirical studies which do not find any evidence to 
support the theoretical argument of the importance of board and ownership structure 
to a firm. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) do not find any significant relationship 
between board structure, ownership concentration and firm value. Consistent with 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (1999) investigate the association 
between board structure and firm performance measured by a number of proxies but 
do not find any significant relationship between the two measures. Moreover, some 
studies show that board characteristics may have a negative impact on a firm’s market 
value. Yermack (1996) and Vafeas (2000) find that large boards are negatively 
associated with firm value.  
There is very limited research examining the impact of board structure, ownership 
concentration on the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. Moreover, the 
question of how corporate governance mechanisms affect the value relevance of 
intangible disclosures is examined indirectly in prior research. For example, in Nekhili 
et al. (2010), instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the value relevance of R&D disclosure, they test whether corporate governance 
mechanisms alter the relationship between R&D voluntary disclosure and market 
value through influencing the level of R&D disclosure. The study first proves that 
better disclosure improves a firm’s market value.  In the second part of study, they 
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find that the existence of audit committee have a significant impact on the R&D 
voluntary disclosure. Other mechanisms such as board independence, CEO duality, 
audit firm’s size do not influence the level of R&D voluntary disclosure, and thus not 
altering the relationship between market and reported information. 
3.6 Summary 
This literature review outlines a number of current issues surrounding intellectual 
capital disclosure including the importance and the problems of intellectual capital 
reporting, the level of intellectual capital disclosure along with the determinants of the 
level of this disclosure, and the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure as 
well as the potential factors that influence the value relevance of this disclosure. This 
literature review identifies a number of gaps and limitations of the current intellectual 
capital research. First, the inconsistent results found in prior research make it difficult 
to generalise the findings to other context and different regulatory settings. Country 
effects might be related to the characteristics of intellectual capital disclosure (White 
et al., 2010). Limited research has been conducted in the New Zealand context. 
Therefore, there is a need for New Zealand studies in order to understand the 
intellectual capital disclosure behaviour, specifically for New Zealand firms. 
Second, most of the research studies examine the intellectual capital disclosure in the 
pre-IFRSs adoption period or does not consider the potential influence of IFRSs 
adoption on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. The international standards 
have made few changes regarding intangible assets reporting, which may influence the 
patterns of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure.  
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Third, as the result of the absence of regulations, most research examines the 
association between corporate governance and other firm-specific factors, and 
voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. In terms of corporate governance, board 
structure and ownership concentration are two of the most influential factors 
associated with the disclosure level. However, the results of these studies are 
inconsistent. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance can be 
altered through political process. Consequently, the effect of board structure and 
ownership concentration on intellectual capital disclosure might be influenced by the 
macroeconomic environment and regulatory intervention. Therefore, again, there is a 
need for a country-specific study. Moreover, most research is based on small samples, 
which might not be capable of representing the population’s corporate disclosure 
patterns. Further, in prior studies, board structure indicators are limited to board size, 
board independence and CEO duality. None of the research studies on intellectual 
capital has attempted to examine other board structure characteristics such as board 
gender diversity.    
In addition, there is limited research on the analysis of the value relevance of 
qualitative intellectual capital disclosure. Value relevance approach is frequently 
adopted to test the disclosure quality. However, much of the value relevance literature 
focuses on testing the value relevance of items that are subject to quantitative 
measurement under the accounting standards rather than on the information with 
narrative nature. The results from those studies have limited scope of interpretation 
and cannot be generalised to the qualitative disclosure.  
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Finally, while there is a large body of literature on the effect of board structure and 
ownership concentration on the level of disclosure, very a few researchers examine 
the impact of those potential factors on the value relevance of intellectual capital 
disclosure. The next chapter develops hypotheses to address the limitations identified 
in the literature review. 
  
50 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Based on the literature review in chapter three and with application of agency theory, 
cost-benefit theory and value relevance approach, this chapter develops hypotheses to 
examine the effect of board structure, ownership concentration on the level and value 
relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. First, section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 discuss the 
theoretical framework adopted to identify the link between board structure, ownership 
concentration and intellectual capital disclosure. Second, the expected impacts of 
chosen factors on the level and the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure 
are discussed in section 4.4 (board structure) and 4.5 (ownership concentration). 
4.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory provides a framework to establish a linkage between voluntary 
disclosure and firm-specific characteristics. Within the agency framework, the firm is 
identified as a legal nexus of contractual relationships among individuals (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The agency relationship describes the contractual relationship 
between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager) due to the separation of 
ownership and control.  Agency costs arise due to the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers, and therefore additional costs are incurred for 
shareholders to monitor managers and align managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, because shareholders are not 
directly involved in the decision making processes, the information asymmetry 
existing between principals and agents contributes to moral hazard problems of the 
51 
 
managers. Managers may take advantages of this information gap to distort the 
information flow and behave opportunistically to pursue personal interests. 
Unlike other tangible assets, intellectual capital is highly risky, uncertain and firm-
specific (Alves and Martins, 2010).  Consequently, agency costs and information 
asymmetry are expected to be high when intellectual capital is intensively involved in 
the business process (Alves and Martins, 2010). These problems can be mitigated 
through the enhanced monitoring systems of the principle  (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and greater disclosure of the activities of the agent (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Within the agency framework, corporate governance literature argues that stronger 
corporate governance system is effective to diminish agency problems. As stated in 
Bushman and Smith (2003), the main purposes of corporate governance are to ensure 
minority shareholders receive reliable information so that they are not expropriated by 
majority shareholders, and to motivate managers to maximise the value of the firm 
instead of pursuing individual objectives.  
Board structure and ownership concentration are considered as two of the fundamental 
corporate governance mechanisms that enhance the monitoring of management and 
contribute to the alignment of managers and investors interests. According to Fama 
and Jensen (1983), the board of directors acts as the highest internal control 
mechanism responsible for monitoring the actions of top management. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) suggest that ownership concentration determines the incentives of 
minority or outside shareholders to monitor the majority or insider shareholders. In 
addition, ownership concentration determines the interrelationships between minority 
and majority shareholders, and external shareholders and internal management. At 
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different ownership concentration levels, the major conflicts of interest may shift from 
those between shareholders and internal management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to 
those between minority shareholders and majority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Gomes, 2000).  
Other non-governance firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, leverage and 
other factors may also contribute to the level of agency costs of a firm and influence 
the effort of a firm on reducing agency problems. Those factors are considered as 
control variable in this thesis and are discussed in section 5.3.1. 
4.2 Cost-benefit theory 
Intellectual capital reporting is not subject to accounting regulations. Therefore, the 
disclosure level of intellectual capital is driven by the incentives of the firm for this 
disclosure. Cost-benefit theory suggests that managers should not fully disclose 
information unless the benefits of extra disclosure exceed its cost burdens and 
proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Additional disclosure benefits a firm in various 
ways. For example, Lang and Lundholm (1996) state that increased disclosure lowers 
the effective interest costs of a company. Other than financial benefits, Pike et al. 
(2002) argue that more extensive disclosure has positive effects on external reputation 
and internal esteem that employees will have in the company and its management. 
However, additional disclosure may result in additional cost burdens and high 
proprietary costs. First, the cost burdens of additional disclosure are the direct costs 
associated with the increased staff time to collect and disclose the information.  
Second, according to Verrecchia (1983), proprietary costs are costs associated with 
the information that may harm a firm if parties other than investors become aware of 
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that information. Intellectual capital is knowledge-based equity and may contain 
“corporate secrets”. By disclosing too much intellectual capital information, a firm 
may lose its competitive advantages through revealing confidential information to its 
opponents.  Costs and benefits of additional disclosure are determined by other non-
governance characteristics such as firm size, profitability and industry types. Section 
5.3.2 discusses how those control factors relate to the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure.  
4.3 Value relevance approach 
An increased level of disclosure does not guarantee the quality of the disclosure. 
Corporate disclosure plays an important role in the modern capital markets. Disclosure 
is an essential tool for management to communicate firm performance to external 
investors. As stated in Verrecchia (1983) and Healy and Palepu (2001), better quality 
of disclosure should assist information users to predict future earnings and accurately 
determine a firm’s market value. In capital market-based accounting research, it is 
assumed that high quality accounting information is more related to the market value 
of a firm (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968). Based on this assumption, the value relevance 
model developed by Ohlson (1995) and Collins et al. (1997) measures the usefulness 
of this information to estimate the market value of the firm.  It is one of the methods 
to test the relevance and reliability of the information. Ohlson (1995) and Collins et al. 
(1997) provide evidence that accounting information such as equity book value and 
earnings act as proxy for expected future returns. 
Prior research suggests that intellectual capital explains the gap between a firm’s 
market and book values (e.g. Brennan and Connell, 2000). Moreover, Amir and Lev 
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(1996) find empirical evidence that financial information under the traditional 
accounting system is no longer useful to investors and this information is only 
informative when combining with non-financial intangible information. Therefore, 
based on the discussion in 4.1 and 4.2, if the corporate governance mechanisms along 
with other factors affect the level of voluntary disclosure, it will consequently 
influence the quality of this disclosure.  
4.4 Board structure 
The board of directors is responsible for ratifying management decision and 
monitoring management performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board of 
directors plays a significant role in establishing corporate disclosure policies and 
overseeing the top managers’ compliance with those disclosure policies.  It is posited 
that the effectiveness of the board in monitoring management is determined by its size, 
independence and gender diversity. 
4.4.1 Board size 
Board size is an important proxy for the effectiveness of monitoring function of the 
board. Larger board has greater diversity of perspectives and skills, which make the 
board more effective and efficient in decision makings (e.g. Pfeffer, 1972). Belkhir 
(2009) provides empirical evidence that boards contribute to better performance of the 
firm. 
It is argued that board size plays a key role in influencing corporate disclosure 
decisions. Abeysekera (2010) indicates that larger boards can supplement the skill 
deficits of directors at an individual level and ensure long-term future earnings of a 
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firm through greater voluntary disclosure. Consistently, Hidalgo et al. (2011) find a 
significant positive relationship between board size and the level of intellectual  
capital disclosure of the Mexican listed companies.  Combining with the results from 
previous research, they also conclude that there is no difference in this relationship 
between developed and developing countries. Moreover, this relationship is 
specifically relevant to human capital disclosure because larger boards are expected to 
contain more competent and knowledgeable personnel. Finally, firms with larger 
boards are more incentive to voluntarily disclose the skills of each board member to 
enhance shareholder confidence in the capital market. 
In terms of value relevance, large board improve the quality of reported information 
through the enhanced monitoring function of the board (Abeysekera, 2010), better 
knowledge and skills (Pfeffer, 1972) and increased level of disclosure (e.g. 
Abeysekera, 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2011). These theoretical arguments are confirmed 
by the empirical evidence in Bradbury et al. (2006) that board size is positively related 
to the quality of information. In addition, large board is more likely to disclose 
information more frequently. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find a positive 
relationship between the frequency of updates of management earnings forecasts and 
board size.  From investors’ perspective, more frequently updated information is more 
useful to estimate the firm’s market value.  In contrast to the above studies, there are 
some empirical evidence shows that large boards negatively relate to the firm’s market 
value (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Vafeas, 2000). The reason may be that larger boards have 
less effective communication and therefore have less decision making capabilities 
(Vafeas, 2000). Following Pfeffer (1972), Bradbury et al. (2006) and Karamanou and 
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Vafeas (2005), this thesis expects a positive impact of a larger board on the value 
relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. 
H1a: The level of intellectual capital disclosure is higher for firms 
with a larger board.  
H1b: The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure is higher 
for firms with a larger board. 
4.4.2 Board independence 
Board structure determines the quality of the monitoring function of the board. 
However, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board cannot effectively monitor the 
actions of top managers if the insiders (top managers) dominate the board. They 
suggest that outside directors are more efficient in the monitoring task and less 
possible to collude with top managers. Therefore, the ability of the board to reduce 
agency costs is enhanced by the inclusion of the outside directors. In line with Fama 
and Jensen (1983), Haniffa and Cooke (2005) state that more non-executive directors 
provide wider expertise, prestige and contracts, which in turn positively influence the 
quality of the function of the board. Also, outside directors have more incentives to 
improve their performance to develop their reputations as qualified outside directors 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Consistent with those theoretical arguments, the 
recommendation of the appointment of independent directors is included in some 
countries’ best corporate governance practices (e.g. New Zealand).  
Various conclusions are drawn from prior corporate disclosure studies. Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) find that the appointment of non-executive directors is associated with 
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additional corporate disclosure. Consistently, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) provide 
empirical evidence for the positive relationship between the inclusion of outside 
directors and voluntary disclosure. However, Ho and Wong (2001) do not find 
significant relationship between board independence and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Further, a number of studies document a negative relationship between the 
percentage of outside directors and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003). 
One possible reason could be that the appointment of outside directors only fill the 
additional position rather than acting as substitutes for existing directors (Cheng and 
Courtnay, 2006).  
With regard to intellectual capital disclosure studies, and consistent with voluntary 
disclosure research, Li et al. (2008) observe that intellectual capital disclosure is 
significantly associated with board independence. On the other hand, Hidalgo et al. 
(2011) find that board independence is not significantly related to the level of 
voluntary disclosure. They suggest that the legal environment may augment or 
diminish this relationship.   
The positive impact of the inclusion of outside directors extends to the quality of 
financial information. Beasley (1996) confirms the importance of outside directors on 
the board in reducing financial statement fraud by examining the board independence 
and financial statement fraud for 150 listed firms in the U.S. The study finds that no-
fraud firms had a significantly higher percentage of outside directors than that of fraud 
firms. Beasley (1996) defines outside directors as all non-employee directors. The 
study adds that the empirical tests are not sensitive to the definition of outside 
directors used. Consistent with Beasley (1996), Dechow et al. (1996) find that insider-
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dominated boards are more likely to associate with the violations of GAAP and the 
overstatement of reported earnings. Following prior literature, Bushman et al. (2004), 
Vafeas (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) provide further empirical evidence 
that information quality increases with the proportion of independent directors. These 
findings imply that valuation based on the information provided by the firm with 
higher proportion of independent directors will be less biased because there are less 
violations and frauds.  As such, information from those firms might be more value 
relevant to investors.  
Following the argument made by Fama and Jensen (1983) and other prior research, 
this study hypothesises that:  
H2a: The level of intellectual capital disclosure is higher for firms 
with a higher proportion of independent directors.  
H2b: The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure is higher 
for firms with a higher proportion of independent directors.  
4.4.3 Board gender diversity 
As a result of growing equality between genders, gender composition of the board has 
become one of the most significant issues in finance and economic literature. Extant 
research provides theoretical argument that the inclusion of women on the board 
benefits the board performance in various ways (e.g. Cox and Blake, 1991; Robinson 
and Dechant, 1997): women provide different perspectives to board decision making, 
better understanding of the marketplace, increased creativity and innovation, 
improvement of problem-solving  skills and organisational flexibilities.  
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Much of literature believes that gender diversity has a positive impact on a firm’s 
long-term and short-term financial values. However, mixed results are observed in 
empirical studies. Shrader et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between the 
proportion of female managers and financial performance of the firm. Following 
Shrader et al (1997), Carter et al. (2003) document that gender diversity is positively 
associated with the firm value measuring by Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Farrell and 
Hersch (2005) also observe a positive relationship between Return on Assets (ROA) 
and gender diversity. However, they argue that adding women on the board does not 
result in value creation. Instead, the result is due to women’s self-selections for better 
performed firms. In contrast to prior studies, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a 
negative relationship between gender diversity and firm performance.  
As discussed earlier, monitoring function of the board has a direct impact on the level 
and quality of corporate disclosure. It is argued that board with higher proportion of 
female directors may be more effective in relating its monitoring function. Carter et al. 
(2003, p. 37) state that gender diversity improves board independence because 
“people with a different gender, ethnicity, or cultural background might ask questions 
that would not come from directors with more traditional backgrounds”. Similarly, 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) provide some evidence that the inclusion of women on 
board improves monitoring function of the board. The study shows that female 
directors generally have better attendance for board meetings than male directors and 
are more likely to join monitoring committees. In addition, male directors appear to 
have better attendance with higher proportion of women on the board.  Board meeting 
frequency is considered as a proxy for the attempt that directors made to monitor the 
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management (Vafeas, 1999).  Therefore, it can be concluded that women behave 
differently in terms of the attempt made to fulfil monitoring duties of the board.  
With regard to the relationship between gender diversity and the quality of financial 
information, Gul et al. (2011) argue that board gender diversity enhances the quality 
of board discussions and improves the ability of the board to provide better quality of 
corporate disclosure. Further, this study provides timely evidence that board gender 
diversity is positively related to the stock price informativeness.  Similarly, following 
the argument made in Adams and Ferreira (2009) that female directors provide better 
oversight over managers, Srinidhi et al. (2011) document that a more diverse board 
improves the quality of earnings. Following both theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence from prior research, it leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: The level of intellectual capital disclosure is higher for firms 
with a higher proportion of female directors on the board. 
H3b: The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure is higher 
for firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board. 
4.5 Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration has a significant impact on the demand and supply of 
corporate disclosure. There are two arguments relating to the effects of ownership 
concentration: entrenchment effect and alignment effect. The entrenchment effect 
refers to the argument that controlling shareholders determine how profits are 
distributed among shareholders, and the interests of minority shareholders may be 
expropriated by the controlling shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1997). In contrast, the alignment effect is based on the argument that 
controlling shareholders are willing to build a reputation for not expropriating 
minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000). The effect of ownership concentration on 
corporate disclosure is the combination of entrenchment and alignment effects. This 
may cause the non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the level 
and quality of corporate disclosure.  
The traditional agency problem deals with the conflict between management and 
shareholders. However, Gomes (2000) argue that in the legal system that does not 
provide protection for minority shareholders, agency problem may also arise between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. As discussed in chapter two, New 
Zealand law does not offer strong minority shareholders protections. As a result, at 
different levels of ownership concentration, the conflicts of interest may shift from 
those between management and shareholders to those between the majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders for New Zealand listed companies. 
At the low level of ownership concentration, both the entrenchment effect and 
alignment effect are weak. External share owners, in this situation, have no influence 
on corporate disclosure decision makings and therefore the company has no pressure 
to disclose additional information. As the ownership concentration level increases, 
especially when a company’s shares are owned by a few controlling shareholders as 
well as a large number of minority shareholders, the level and the quality of corporate 
disclosure improves as a result of the increased power of external shareholders and 
alignment effect.  According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983), the separation ownership and control create incentives of powerful outside 
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shareholders monitoring the internal managers’ behaviour. Hence, investors demand 
higher levels of information to monitor the management as there is a lack of first-hand 
access to information (Gelb, 2000; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). An increased 
disclosure level reduces information asymmetry and provides higher protection of 
shareholders’ interests and thus reduces the conflicts between contracting parties. 
Alternatively, when controlling shareholders are internal owners (managerial 
ownership), there is an increasing in the incentives for managers to develop a 
reputation for treating minority shareholders well (Gomes, 2000; Fan and Wong, 
2002). Gomes (2000) find empirical evidence that the reputation effect is significant 
whenever the moral hazard problem is significant. When ownership concentration 
level continues to increase, it is expected that the level of disclosure might decrease. 
Higher ownership level gives shareholders sufficient power to obtain company’s 
information so that there is a decrease in the demand of corporate disclosure (Makhija 
and Patton, 2004). The alignment effect might be mitigated by the entrenchment effect 
when a company’s shares are owned by a few blockholders. For example, in the 
extreme case when the manager owns all company’s share, there will be no demand 
for a level of disclosure and a reputation effect. That company will have no motivation 
to disclosure additional information and be more likely to limit the disclosure to the 
mandatory requirement level.  
The empirical evidence on the relation between ownership concentration and the level 
of disclosure is mixed.  Chau and Gray (2002), Lakhal (2005) and others provide 
empirical evidence of a positive (negative) association between voluntary disclosures 
and ownership diffusion (concentration). Numbers of study examine the impact of 
ownership concentration on intellectual capital disclosure (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Hidalgo 
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et al., 2011; Whiting and Woodcock, 2011). Li et al. (2008) find that share ownership 
concentration shows significant negative associations with intellectual capital 
disclosed in annual reports of the U.K. listed companies. In contrast, Hidalgo et al. 
(2011) do not find significant relationship between ownership concentration and 
intellectual capital disclosure within the Mexican context. In line with Hidalgo et al. 
(2011), Whiting and Woodcock (2011) find that intellectual capital disclosure of 
Australian firms is not associated with ownership concentration.    
In terms of the relation between ownership concentration and the quality of 
information, again, prior research provides mixed evidence with respect to the 
association between these two variables. Fan and Wong (2002) find that concentrated 
ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness in the East Asian context. 
Wang (2006), on the other hand, document that highly concentrated ownership of 
firms is significantly associated with better earnings quality in the U.S. These mixed 
results might be caused by the different combined effects of entrenchment and 
alignment effects at different levels of ownership concentration. 
There are limited studies investigating the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure. Makhija and Patton (2004) examine the 
impact of ownership concentration on voluntary disclosure in newly privatised Czech 
firms. They observe a positive relationship at a low level of ownership concentration 
but a negative relationship at a high level. Consistent with Makhija and Patton (2004), 
Jiang and Habib (2009) confirm the non-linear pattern of relationship between 
ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure of New Zealand listed companies. 
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According to theoretical arguments and empirical studies, the hypotheses are written 
as follows: 
H4a: The level of intellectual capital disclosure is positively 
(negatively) related to ownership concentration at a lower (higher) 
level of ownership concentration. 
H4b: The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure is positively 
(negatively) related to ownership concentration at a lower (higher) 
level of ownership concentration 
4.6 Summary 
Using prior literature along with agency theory, cost-benefit theory and value 
relevance approach, this chapter develops hypotheses to examine the relationship 
between board structure, ownership concentration and intellectual capital disclosure. 
The next chapter describes the research methodology that will be used to test the 
hypotheses discussed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses developed in 
chapter four. Section 5.1 explains the sample selection process and study period. 
Section 5.2 and 5.3 describe the development of research instruments and models. An 
outline of the measures for relevant variables in the research models is provided in 
section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 discusses how hypotheses will be tested using the 
developed models.  
5.1 Sample selection and study period 
This thesis examines the impact of board structure and ownership concentration on the 
level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports of NZX 
listed firms. The selected study period is a four-year post-NZ IFRSs mandatory 
adoption period between 1 January 2008 and 31 August 2011. Considering the 
relatively smaller size of the New Zealand capital market, the initial sample includes 
annual reports released by all NZX listed firms during the selected period.  Equity 
trusts and funds are excluded because these types of entities have different natures and 
management systems from ordinary businesses. These entities are not expected to 
have or disclose any intellectual capital.  
Corporate annual reports are used as the main source to determine the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure in this thesis. Corporate annual report is one of the most 
widely used and important information. Botosan (1997, p. 329) suggests that annual 
reports can be “a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure provided by a firm 
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across all disclosure avenues”.  Evidence shows that there is a positive relationship 
between corporate disclosure levels in annual report and via other media (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). The annual reports and all other relevant information are obtained 
from NZX database. The primary sample includes: 
• All entities listed on the NZX between 1 January 2008 and 31 August 2011; 
• Having annual reports available before and on 31 August 2011; and 
• Not an equity trusts and funds entity. 
After examining all annual reports of the firms from the primary sample, firms that are 
managed by external companies or with no employees are eliminated because certain 
types of intellectual capital are not relevant to those firms. The final sample comprises 
155 firms covering a total of 519 firm-years. Table 1 illustrates the sample selection 
process and the size of final sample. 
Table 1 Sample selection process 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the period 1 January 2008 to 31 August 2011. The starting date 
1 January 2008 is chosen because all annual reports released on and after this date are 
based on NZ IFRSs. Annual reports released before this date can be either based on 
NZ IFRSs or the old GAAP. In order to obtain sufficient data for analysing, annual 
I. Primary sample selection 
   All annual reports available during the selected period 562 
   Excludes annual reports issued by equity trusts and funds entities (23) 
II. Final sample selection 
Excludes annual reports issued by firms with external 
management team or no employee (20) 
Final sample 519 
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reports published on 31 August 2011 are the most recent annual reports can be 
obtained. 
 
5.2 Development of the research instrument 
5.2.1 Disclosure index 
As discussed earlier, intellectual capital disclosure is not mandatorily required by 
accounting standards. Therefore, this thesis examines intellectual capital disclosure 
that is outside the scope of NZ IFRSs. As discussed previously, NZ IAS 38 is not able 
to capture all intangible assets that contribute to the future economic benefits. Entity 
can only recognise an intangible asset when it can be measured accurately in 
quantitative terms. However, figure-only information has the lowest level of value 
added to the information (Sveiby, 1997). Text and analysis are more informative to 
the information users. Due to the lack of mandatory requirement, a firm will only 
disclose the information that will benefit the firm. Therefore, voluntary disclosure is 
also an important source to understand how firms benefits from their resources.  
The level of intellectual capital is the dependent variable in the model to test the first 
research question and one of the independent variables in the model to test the second 
question. This thesis adopts the content analysis method to examine intellectual capital 
information disclosed in corporate annual reports. A self-constructed disclosure index 
is used to measure the level of intellectual capital disclosure. The disclosure index is 
one of the most common research instruments to quantify the extent of disclosure in 
annual reports, especially for voluntary narrative disclosure (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Lev, 
2001 and others). However, use of disclosure index is subject to several limitations. 
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According to Marston and Shrives (1991), one of the limitations is that the quantity of 
disclosure is not necessarily a proxy for the quality of information. To solve this 
problem, this thesis conducts separate tests for the quantity (level) and quality (value 
relevance) of the information, respectively.  Similar to other studies employing  
indices, this thesis adopts an item-based approach, where a score of 1 is given for each 
item disclosed and a score of 0 is given if the item is not disclosed. This thesis does 
not weight any item in the disclosure index, which means that all the information in 
the list is of equal importance. The use of a non-weighted index is able to avoid 
subjectivity. Furthermore, evidence shows that use of both weighted and non-
weighted indices reach the same results (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).  
The procedures of constructing the disclosure index include three steps: (1) reviewing 
prior disclosure literature and constructing a preliminary checklist; (2) comparing 
preliminary checklist items with New Zealand financial reporting regulations (e.g. NZ 
IAS 38), and excluding the items that are mandatorily required; (3) pilot-testing on a 
sample of 15 annual reports to refine the index and exclude the irrelevant items. 
5.2.2 Selection of categories and items  
Categories and items selections determine the quality of a disclosure index. In order to 
develop a well-designed disclosure index, a review of several intellectual capital 
disclosure indices developed in prior studies is conducted. Various frameworks have 
been developed and adopted by recent studies. For example, voluntary studies such as 
Hashim and Saleh (2007) and Nekhili et al. (2010) apply Botosan’s (1997) framework 
(which based on American Institute of Certified Public Accountants report), whereas 
Kang and Gray (2011) design their index of R&D voluntary disclosure based on Lev’s 
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(2001) value chain scoreboard framework. Among those studies, even though the 
indices are developed based on the same framework, the size, category structure and 
scoring system of the index varies from one study to another. For example, Jones 
(2007) adopts Botosan’s (1997) framework to develop the R&D voluntary disclosure 
index. He uses a checklist of 47 items allotting 1 or 2 points for each item. On the 
other hand, Hashim and Saleh (2007), while adopting the same framework, use a total 
of 60 items with 1, 1.5, 2 or 3 points for each item. Nekhili et al.’s (2010) checklist 
comprises of 33 items, and each item is given equal weight.  
As there is no generally accepted definition and classification for intellectual capital, 
intellectual capital disclosure indices show less similarity to each other. Unlike 
general voluntary disclosures, there is no basic framework that can be broadly applied 
in voluntary intellectual capital disclosure studies. Studies use different categories to 
distinguish different types of intellectual capital. The category selections are described 
in the Table 2 below (sub-categories excluded). 
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Table 2 Categories in intellectual capital disclosure indices 
Reference Categories (number of items) 
Guthrie and Petty (2000) Internal structure (11), External structure (9), Employee 
competence (6) 
Bontis (2003) No specific category (39) 
Gandia (2003)8 Innovation index (9), Human resources index (9), Customers 
index (6), Networking index (5)  
 
Bukh et al. (2005) Employees (27), Customers (14), IT (5), Processes (8), 
Research and development (9), Strategic statement (15) 
Li et al. (2008) Human capital (22), Structural capital (18), Relational capital 
(21) 
Singh and Kansalv (2011) Internal: organisational (structural) capital (3), Internal 
infrastructure assets (6), External: customer (relational) capital 
(9), Employee competence: human capital (24) 
Nurunnabi et al.(2011) Internal (structural) capital (11), External (relational) capital 
(19), Human (employee) capital (17) 
 
After reviewing prior literature, this thesis adopts Sveiby’s (1997) classification and 
classifies intellectual capital into three categories: employee competence, external 
structural and internal structural (or human capital, relational capital and structural 
capital). These three components are the most frequently adopted components in prior 
study. 
The items selected for the disclosure index is drawn from a variety of definitions and 
indices developed in prior studies. In order to capture most of intellectual capital, this 
thesis develops a detailed checklist which covers most items used in prior literature 
that are considered to be relevant in the New Zealand context.  In addition, the 
checklist includes the items that are recently added to the scope of intellectual capital. 
                                                          
8 The listed categories are within one of the sub-indices of Gandia’s (2003) index – Content Internet 
Index. Other sub-indices are not relevant.  
71 
 
Claver-Corters et al. (2007) suggest that environmental capital has a similar nature as 
intellectual capital, therefore should be recognised as intellectual capital. By extending 
Chaver-Corters et al. (2007), this thesis also includes social capital in the disclosure 
index. In accordance with theoretical arguments, empirical studies, the New Zealand 
context and a pilot-testing of 15 sample annual reports, the final disclosure index 
consists of 3 categories with 54 items. The descriptions and scoring methods are 
provided in Appendix A.  
5.2.3 Intellectual capital components and business success 
According to Edvinsson and Malone (1997), intellectual capital reporting has little 
value for information users unless it is linked to the strategy of the firm. Intellectual 
capital disclosure does not only reveal the disclosure behaviour regarding this 
information, but also reflects a company’s strategies and activities to improve its 
market competitiveness, maintain its value and long-term growth. Therefore, the 
usefulness of disclosed information to understand the business success strategies of a 
firm is also considered in the disclosure index development process. The section 
below explains how intellectual capital components relate to the organisational 
success.  
Human capital 
Edvinsson and Malone (1997) define human capital as individual abilities, knowledge, 
know-how, talent, and experience of both employees and managers of a firm. Human 
capital theory by Becker (1964) suggests that human resources are the most important 
asset of an organisation. Therefore, education and training raise the productivity of 
works through improved knowledge and skills (Becker, 1994).  Similarly, Sveiby 
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(1997, p.86) argues that people are the only true agents in business. He states that 
human capital is “the place where all the ladders start…” People create external and 
internal structures to express themselves to the market. As a result, all assets and 
structures are the result of human actions. Consistent with the prior literature, Bontis 
(1999) indicates that human capital is important as it is the source of strategic 
innovation for organisations.  
Employee competence is the most important resource owned by an organisation 
because organisations cannot function without people. Even though employee 
competence cannot be disclosed as intangible assets under the current standards, the 
majority of intangible assets studies consider human capital as an important attribute 
to a firm’s value. In an empirical study, Maditinos et al. (2011) find that only human 
resources are the most significant factors of economic success (financial gains) after 
examining 96 Greek listed companies.   
Relational capital (External structural capital) 
Relational capital refers to the relationships of a firm with its customers and suppliers 
as well as the knowledge embedded in those relationships (Bontis et al., 2000). In 
addition, Sveiby (1997) suggests that market orientation capital such as brand names, 
trademarks, and the company’s reputation or image should be also categorised as 
external structural capital. The importance of relational capital as a value driver is 
documented in numbers of empirical studies. Amir and Lev (1996) state that market 
penetration or the potential number of customers is the fundamental determinants of 
the value of firms. Similarly, Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) find that advertising 
investments have large, positive and consistent influence on the value of the company. 
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Structural capital (Internal structural capital) 
The internal structure is the flow of knowledge within an organisation (Sveiby, 1997). 
It includes patents, concepts, models, computers, administrative systems and 
organisational culture or spirit, which are created or acquired by an organisation. 
Structural capital is another important input of organisation’s future growth in the new 
knowledge-based economy. Freeman’s (1982) innovation theory and Aghion and 
Howitt’s (1998) endogenous growth theory highlight that investment in R&D and 
accumulation of knowledge are the fundamental determinants of economic growth.  
Innovation theory by Freeman (1982) emphasises the role of new product or new 
equipment in value creation, whereas Aghion and Howitt (1998) indicate that the 
long-term economic growth is determined by the creation of new technological 
knowledge. According to those theories, the monopoly power is granted through 
producing new technologies and other organisational-specific knowledge (Sveiby, 
1997).  
5.3 Development of the research models 
5.3.1 The level of intellectual capital disclosure 
As discussed in chapter four, three board structure characteristics (board size, board 
independence and board gender diversity) and ownership concentration are predicted 
to be related to the level of intellectual capital disclosure. This thesis expects a non-
linear relationship between ownership concentration and the level of disclosure. In this 
respect, a quadratic variable of the ownership concentration has been included in the 
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model. The relationship of board structure, ownership concentration and the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure is expressed as follows: 
𝐼𝐶 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛽3 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑂𝐶 + 𝛽5 𝑂𝐶2 +  𝜀  
where IC is the level of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital, Brdsize, Brdindp 
and Brdfemale are board size, board independence, board gender diversity, 
respectively, OC is ownership concentration. 
Besides board structure and ownership concentration, other firm-specific 
characteristics are also expected to have significant impacts on the level of intellectual 
capital disclosure. Those control variables are incorporated in the model.  
Firm size 
Firm size is the most frequently used control variable in disclosure literature (e.g. Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Li et al., 2008). A Number of theories argue 
that firm size is positively associated with the level of disclosure. Within the agency 
framework, larger firms are expected have higher agency costs and therefore there is a 
higher demand of corporate disclosure to reduce the information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Following this argument, 
Hashim and Saleh (2007) provide empirical evidence that larger firms disclose more 
annual report information than smaller firms. Stakeholder theory suggests that 
stakeholders have right to be informed how company’s operations affect them. Larger 
companies may have a wider range of stakeholders with different interests. As 
different stakeholders demand different perspectives of the companies, this requires 
company to provide a more comprehensive set of information.  Robb et al. (2001) 
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show that larger firms disclose higher levels of forward-looking and historical non-
financial information in their annual reports. Cost-benefit theory also supports positive 
relationship between firm size and the level of disclosure. Cost burdens of information 
are relatively smaller to larger firms than that of smaller firms. In accordance with 
these theoretical arguments, White et al (2010) document that the extent of intellectual 
capital disclosure is significantly associated with firm size.  
On the other hand, risk aversion theory argues that smaller firms are more motivated 
to disclose more information because shareholders of those firms are more risky and 
have less access to information (Bukh et al. 2005). However, Bukh et al. (2005) do not 
find significant correlation between firm size and the extent of disclosure. They 
suggest that this result is based on limited observations and only reflect to the situation 
of the companies at the time of the publication of their IPOs prospectuses.  
Leverage 
Companies with higher level of debt incur higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and have particular debt covenants liabilities (Dhaliwal et al., 1982). 
Consequently, managers are motivated to disclose additional information to reduce 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or choose particular accounting policies in 
order to fulfil the obligations in existing debt covenants (Dhaliwal et al. 1982). Mixed 
results are documented in prior research. Whiting and Woodcock (2011) prove that 
leverage does have positive effects on intellectual capital disclosures. White et al. 
(2010) find that leverage is an important factor to affect voluntary intellectual capital 
disclosure in large Australian biotechnology companies. However, Eng and Mak 
(2003) find a negative relationship between leverage and level of voluntary disclosure. 
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Ho and Wong (2001) and Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) do not find any significant 
relationship between leverage and disclosure.  
Profitability 
The relationship between profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure varies 
depending on the nature of information. Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that 
managers are motivated to voluntarily disclose more information when performance is 
good to support the quality of earnings. However, following Verrecchia’s (1983) cost-
benefit theory, Williams (2001) suggests that firm may reduce its voluntary disclosure 
when reaches good performance to protect its competitive advantage. Compared to 
tangible assets, certain intellectual capital such as secret process contains higher level 
of confidential information that needs to be protected. Incentives of a firm to maintain 
competitiveness can be a factor to discourage companies to voluntarily disclose this 
information. Li et al. (2008) document that the level of intellectual capital is positively 
associated with profitability. Sonnier et al. (2007), however, find a negative 
relationship between profitability and the level of intellectual capital disclosure. 
Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) and Hidalgo et al. (2011) do not find significant association 
between the level of disclosure and profitability.  
Listing age 
Li et al. (2008) and Whiting and Woodcock (2011) argue that listing age might be 
negatively related to the corporate disclosure decisions.  Both papers indicate that 
agency theory and risk aversion explain the linkage between listing age and the level 
of disclosure. For example, shareholders expect higher agency costs for younger 
companies without an established shareholder base. Therefore, those firms may have 
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more incentives to disclose higher level information in order to reduce shareholders’ 
risk and lower cost of capital (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Li et al. (2008) find 
moderate evidence to support this relationship. However, Whiting and Woodcock 
(2011) does not find any significant association between listing age and the level of 
disclosure. 
Industry type 
It is argued that industry type is associated with the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure. According to Verrecchia (1983), the level of voluntary disclosure varies 
across industries because of different competitive levels within each industry. Firms in 
highly competitive industries may face potential costs when disclose additional 
information to their competitors (Verrecchia, 1983). Intellectual capital is usually 
considered as a key component to determine a firm’s competitiveness, especially for 
intangible-intensive industries. As a result, managers are reluctant to disclosure such 
information to the public.  However, Whiting and Woodcock (2011) argue that 
intangible-intensive firms have more motivation to disclose higher level of intellectual 
capital because they rely more on intangibles to create value. Additional disclosure of 
such information enhances investors’ confidence about a firm’s future growth 
potential.   
Consistent with these theoretical arguments, much of empirical intellectual capital 
disclosure literature considers industry type as an important determinant of the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure (e.g. Garcia-Meca et al., 2005; Bruggen et al., 2009; 
Kianto et al., 2010; and Whiting and Woodcock, 2011). Bruggen et al. (2009) find the 
significant impact of the industry type on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. 
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The study observes that firms from health care and information technology industries 
disclose significantly more information on intellectual capital than other industries. 
Kianto et al. (2010) compare intellectual capital disclosure level of product-oriented 
and service-oriented firms and find that human capital is higher for service-oriented 
business than for product-oriented firms. Consistent with prior studies, Whiting and 
Woodcock (2011) find that technology-based or knowledge-intensive industries 
disclose a higher level of intellectual capital than other industries. However, Garcia-
Meca et al. (2005) do not find any evidence that the industry type is associated with 
the disclosure level. 
International listing status 
Companies listed on foreign stock exchanges are expected to have a higher level of 
corporate disclosure because they are subject to more regulations (Cooke, 1989). For 
example, prior studies suggest that the U.S. listed companies show higher levels of 
compliance with disclosure requirements (e.g. Glaum and Street, 2003). Singhvi and 
Desai (1971) find that international listing status is significantly associated with the 
disclosure level. With regard to intellectual capital literature, Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) 
expect a significant relationship between international listing status and the level of 
disclosure, however, they do not find evidence to support their hypothesis.  
After controlling for the non-governance firm-specific factors, the full model is 
expressed as follows: 
RI:  𝐼𝐶 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛽3 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑂𝐶 + 𝛽5 𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽11 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 +  𝜀 
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where variables Brdsize, Brdindp, Brdfemale, OC and OC2 are defined as before,  
Firmsize, Lev, Prof, Listage, Industries and Intstatus represent firm size, leverage, 
profitability, listing age, industry type and international listing status, respectively. 
Section 5.4 describes the measurement of those variables. 
5.3.2 The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure 
The Collins et al.’s (1997) modified version of the Ohlson’s (1995) model (Ohlson-
Collins model) has been employed to examine the determinants of the value relevance 
of intellectual capital. In capital market-based accounting research, this model is one 
of the most widely adopted models to test the informativeness of accounting 
information in the capital markets. The model provides a solid framework to explain 
the gap between firm’s book value and market value. The original Ohlson-Collins 
model constitutes two essential accounting variables (book value of equity and 
earnings), as well as other information as explanatory factors to explain the 
differences between book value and market value of a firm.   
The regression of original Ohlson-Collins model is written as follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑋 + 𝜖 
where, Pit is stock price of firm i. Ei is the reported earnings per share of firm i for 
year t. BVi is the book value per share of firm i at the end of year t. X is other 
accounting information that may also influence the stock price. The rationale behind 
this model is that book value of equity and earnings are expected to be unbiased 
estimators of market value when there is no other factor altering the book value-
market value relation.  
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Knowledge-based equity is considered as a main driving factor for the difference 
between market and book values. Value relevance of intangibles studies focus on 
testing the ability of disclosed intangible information (as other information X) to 
explain firm’s market value.  Some studies apply the model to quantitative 
information only such as non-current intangibles (e.g. Abdul-Skukor et al., 2008), 
software capitalisation (e.g. Aboody and Lev, 1998), R&D (e.g. Cazavan-Jeny and 
Jeanjean, 2006).  However, other studies argue that the usefulness of financial 
information to predict market value decreases in fast-changing and technology-based 
industry (e.g. Aimir and Lev, 1996).  The increased gap between the book value and 
market value of firm’s equity implies the inadequacy of financial information for firm 
valuation and indicates the growing need for non-quantitative intellectual capital 
information (Abhayawansa and Guthrie, 2010). Similarly, as stated in Veltri and 
Silverstri (2011), non-financial information fits more to the definition of “other 
information” in Ohlson (1995) that “the events known to the market but not yet 
embedded in the firm’s accounting system” (Veltri and Silverstri, 2011, p.235). 
Following the prior value relevance of non-financial information studies, this thesis 
includes intellectual capital as “other information variable” in the model.   
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝜖 
Value relevance of accounting information is influenced by many firm-specific factors. 
Control variables are included to isolate the effect of corporate governance on value 
relevance of accounting information. Firm specific characteristics such as firm size, 
leverage, industry type are frequently used as control variables in prior research. 
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Evidence shows that those factors have significant impacts on the value relevance of 
accounting information.    
Firm size 
The first firm-specific control variable is firm size. It has been proved that firm size 
have a significant impact on investors’ focus on the reported accounting information. 
Collins et al. (1997) state that information is valued differently depending on the firm 
size. They argue that book value of equity should be more informative for smaller 
firms because smaller firms are more likely to face financial distress than larger firms. 
Much of value relevance literature includes firm size as a control for other missing 
factors and confirm that firm size have some effects on the book – market value 
relation (e.g. Fan and Wong, 2002; Habib and Azim ,2008). Knowledge-based equity 
studies such as Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) find that the effectiveness of knowledge-
based assets investment is associated with the firm size. As such, the value created 
through the investment in such assets differs according to the firm size. 
Leverage 
Higher leverage level is associated with greater degree of risk of holding the firm’s 
equity (e.g. Vafeas, 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; and Habib and Azim, 2008). 
Martikainen (1997) argue that an increase in financial leverage raises the risk of 
managers to manipulate earnings in order to avoid debt covenant violations and 
consequently reduces the quality of accounting information. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the value relevance of reporting information for the firm with a higher 
debt level is lower for investors because of increased financial and default risks. 
However, Habib and Azim (2008) provide an alternative argument that the lenders 
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recognise that firm with higher level of debt may have lower quality of accounting 
information, and therefore additional steps will be taken to ensure there is less 
opportunity for manager to manipulate the information. As a consequence, the level  
of leverage should be positively related to the value relevance of information. 
Industry type 
Intellectual capital is more associated with firm market value for certain industries 
than others. For example, Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) suggest that the improvement 
effects of R&D and advertising on product differentiation differ across industries. 
R&D investment is more related to new product development and differentiation for 
manufacturers, whereas advertising spending has broad effects on product 
differentiation and recognition for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. 
Similarly, Whiting and Woodcock (2011) argue that the profitability of technology-
based or knowledge-intensive industries mainly rely on intellectual capital. Therefore 
it can be argued that intellectual capital investment is more related to the future 
earning potential for high-tech firms than other firms. As a result, investors may value 
more on the intellectual capital information disclosed by high-tech firms. 
The control variables adjusted model is written as: 
R II (1): 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖 
To examine the influence of board structure and ownership concentration on the value 
relevance of intellectual capital disclosure, this thesis employs Habib and Azim’s 
(2008) method. Three board structure characteristics (board size, board independence 
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and board gender diversity), and ownership concentration are added to RII (1). In 
addition, similar to the level of disclosure model, a quadratic variable of the 
ownership concentration is added to test the non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure [RII 
(2)]. Further, following Habib and Azim (2008), interaction terms between board 
structure factors and intellectual capital disclosure, ownership concentration and 
intellectual capital disclosure are added to model R II (2) to examine the effects of 
board structure and ownership concentration on the value relevance of intellectual 
capital [RII (3)].  
RII (2): 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝛾7𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾8 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛾9𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛾10 𝑂𝐶 +  𝛾11𝑂𝐶2 +  𝜖 
R II (3): 
Pit= 𝛾0 +  𝛾1 𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2 𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝛾7 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾8 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛾9 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛾10 𝑂𝐶 +  𝛾11 𝑂𝐶2 +  𝛾12 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗
𝐼𝐶 +  𝛾13 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾14 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾15 𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾16 𝑂𝐶2 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 +  𝜖 
where Pit, Ei and BVi are defined as before.  IC is the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure. Firmsize, Lev and Industries are firm size, leverage and industry type. 
Brdsize, Brdindp, Brdfemale, and OC are board size, board independence, board 
gender diversity, and ownership concentration.  
84 
 
5.4 Measurement of variables 
5.4.1 Measurement of intellectual capital disclosure 
The level of intellectual capital disclosure is calculated as:  
𝐼𝐶 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  (∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 )/N 
where di is number of disclosed items for firm-year i and N is the potential maximum 
score (i.e. 54 items).  
Considering the possibility of overlap among categories (e.g. favourite contracts in 
relational capital and legal contracts in structural capital), item is only coded once 
under the most relevant category. Second, the index is aim to capture the level of 
disclosure and not the frequency of the disclosure, therefore frequently disclosed items 
or majorly discussed items are only coded once. In other words, the scores do not 
distinguish how much information a company disclosed regarding one particular item. 
Further, as mentioned earlier, another purpose of the disclosure design is to describe 
companies’ strategies and activities regarding intellectual capital. Therefore, score 0 
means a company fails to disclose certain details of a particular sub-category (e.g. age 
of directors) or fail to conduct activities to improve its competitiveness in the market 
(e.g. R&D for new products).  
A similar maximum score is applied to all companies. This approach is consistent with 
most prior intellectual capital studies (e.g. Bukh et al. 2005; Abeysekera, 2010). Some 
studies use different potential maximum scores for each company as some items might 
be irrelevant to a particular company or industry (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al, 
1995).  This method considers individual scenario and provides a fair scoring system 
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for each company. However, it may result that companies with less content disclosed 
but has high scores when most of the items are considered to be irrelevant to those 
companies (i.e. small denominator). To overcome the problems that some items might 
be irrelevant to certain companies, the disclosure index is designed to be applied to all 
types of companies.  
First, instead of including specific intangible items (e.g. brand, special rights) as 
individual items in the checklist, the disclosure items focus on how many details a 
firm disclosed regarding a group of individual intellectual capital items with similar 
features. In other words, the type(s) of intellectual capital appear as sub-categories in 
the index, and each individual item in the index measures one general aspect of that 
sub-category (e.g. intellectual property as sub-category and features of IP as 
individual item of this sub-category).   
Second, the creation of sub-categories tends to be suitable for all companies. To 
achieve this, a wider definition of each sub-category has been used. For example, sub-
category research and development includes the R&D of all sorts of company 
activities such as new strategies, new methods, and new products (see Appendix A for 
the definition of individual items). So that research and development section is not 
limited to high-tech companies.  
Finally, even though the sub-categories are supposed to apply to all companies, there 
are certain companies that do not operate in a general understanding ways. Those 
companies are outside the scope of this thesis. For example, for companies that do not 
have employees and management team, they are excluded from the sample (see 
section 5.1).     
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5.4.2 Measurement of other variables  
Table 3 summarises the measurement of all other variables including board structure 
indicators, ownership concentration, value relevance and control variables. In the level 
of intellectual capital model, board structure indicators, ownership concentration and 
control variables are independent variables. In the value relevance model, share price 
is the dependence variable, whereas all others are independent variables.   
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Table 3 Measurement of variables 
Variables  Definition Code 
Board structure variables:  
Board size Number of directors serving on the board Brdsize 
Board independence Proportion of independent directors on the 
board 
Brdindp 
Board gender diversity The percentage of female directors on the 
board 
Brdfemale 
Ownership concentration variable:  
Ownership concentration Herfindahl index* OC 
Value relevance variables:   
Share price The available price of a share of a company 
at the nearest date after the release of annual 
report 
P 
Earnings per share Net profit after tax over number of shares 
issued 
E 
Book value per share Book value of equity over number of shares 
issued 
BV 
Control variables:   
Firm size The nature logarithm of total assets Firmsize 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to the total asset of the 
firm 
Lev 
Profitability Net profit over the book value of equity Prof 
Listing age Number of years the firm’s stock has traded 
on the stock exchange 
Listage 
Industry type Dummy variable, indicator variable equal to 
1 if the company is in high-tech industries, 
and 0 otherwise** 
Industries 
International listing status Dummy variable, indicator variable equal to 
1 if the company is listed on more than one 
stock market, and 0 otherwise 
Intstatus 
Note: 
* Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index. The index is calculated by the following 
formula:  
Ownership concentration =  ∑ �
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒊
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 �𝟐𝒏=𝟓𝒊=𝟏  
**Industry classification 
This thesis uses Global Industry Classification Standard (GISCS) as a guideline to classify the sample 
companies. The GISCS divides companies into 10 main sectors and each sector comprises of several 
industry groups. Because New Zealand capital market is relative small, there are not sufficient numbers 
of companies for testing in certain sectors or industry groups. As a result, the sample firms are 
classified as either high-tech or low-tech using their industry groups in GICS. The process is guided by 
prior literature such as Whiting and Woodcock (2011). Whiting and Woodcock’s (2011) modified 
GISC framework is presented in Appendix B. 
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5.5 Regression models and hypotheses tests 
Final versions of the two models to be used to examine the impact of board structure 
and ownership concentration on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital 
disclosure are presented below. 
RI:  𝐼𝐶 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛽3 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑂𝐶 + 𝛽5 𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽11 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 +  𝜀 
R II (3): Pit= 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝛾7𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾8 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛾9𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛾10 𝑂𝐶 +  𝛾11𝑂𝐶2 +  𝛾12𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗
𝐼𝐶 +  𝛾13𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾14𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾15𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾16𝑂𝐶2 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 +  𝜖 
Where  
IC = intellectual capital disclosure index 
Brdsize = total number of directors on the board 
Brdindp = percentage of independent directors on the board 
Brdfemale = percentage of female directors on the board 
OC = Herfindahl index 
OC2 = The square of Herfindahl index 
Firmsize = the nature logarithm of total assets 
Lev = the ratio of total debt to the total asset 
Prof = net profit over the book value of equity 
Listage = number of years the firm’s stock has traded on the stock exchange 
Industries = 1 for high-tech industries, 0 otherwise 
Intstatus = 1 for multi-listing firms, 0 otherwise 
Pit = the price of a share at fiscal year-end or nearest available price 
Ei = net profit after tax per share 
 
RI is developed to examine the level of intellectual capital. The expected impact of 
board structure indicators and ownership concentration on the level of intellectual 
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capital disclosure in chapter four (i.e. H1a, H2a H3a and H4a) can be confirmed by 
the positive significant coefficients of β1-β4 and negative significant coefficient of β5.  
Hypotheses of the value relevance of intellectual capital H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b will 
be tested by model R II (3). Value relevance of information is measured by the 
explanatory power of the regression (Barth et al., 2000). Therefore, overall, R II (3) is 
expected to have the highest explanatory power among all regressions [i.e. RII (1), RII 
(2) and RII (3)]. In addition, according to Habib and Azim (2008), if the board 
structure factors are positively associated with the intellectual capital disclosure, the 
coefficients of interaction terms are expected positive and significant (γ12-γ14). Also, 
if ownership concentration has expected influence on the value relevance of 
intellectual capital, γ15 should be positive and significant and γ 16 
5.6 Summary 
is expected to be 
negative and significant.  
This chapter describes the sample selection process and research design. To measure 
the level of intellectual capital disclosure, a self-constructed disclosure index is 
developed. In addition, regression models have been developed to test the impact of 
board structure and ownership concentration on the level and value relevance of 
intellectual capital. The dependent and independent variables are specified, along with 
control variables used in the model. Further, how the hypotheses developed in chapter 
four will be tested is also explained at the end of this chapter. The next chapter reports 
the descriptive statistics for the level and extent of the intellectual capital disclosure as 
well as other relevant variables for 519 firm-years. The results of hypotheses testing 
are also discussed in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS 
This chapter reports and discusses the descriptive statistics and hypothesis results for  
the potential influence of three board structure indicators - board size, board 
independence and board gender diversity  and ownership concentration on the level 
and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. Section 6.1 describes the level 
and extent of intellectual capital disclosure presented by New Zealand listed firms 
during the period from 2008 to 2011. The descriptive statistics for other variables used 
in the model are also presented. Section 6.2 reports the hypothesis testing results 
related to the level of intellectual capital disclosure. Both univariate and multivariate 
tests are conducted to test these hypotheses. The hypothesis testing results for the 
value relevance of intellectual capital are presented in section 6.3. Sensitivity analysis 
results are presented in section 6.4. Finally, section 6.5 discusses key findings and 
section 6.6 concludes this chapter. 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
6.1.1 The level and extent of intellectual capital disclosure  
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the intellectual capital disclosure and the 
disclosure of individual intellectual capital components in accordance with the 
Sveiby’s (1997) classification.  
 
 
  
91 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the level of intellectual capital (IC) disclosure 
Period 
(Observations) 
 Intellectual 
Capital  
(54 items) 
Human 
Capital* 
(16 items) 
Relational 
Capital* 
(21 items) 
Structural 
Capital* 
(17 items) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of total IC and individual IC components  
2008-2011 
(519) 
Mean 0.187 0.230 0.216 0.112 
Std. dev. 0.137 0.196 0.179 0.120 
Min. 0 0 0 0 
Max. 0.593 0.875 0.762 0.529 
Skewness 0.656 0.924 0.646 1.280 
Kurtosis** 2.660 3.390 2.612 4.429 
Panel B: total IC and individual IC components by year 
2008 Mean 0.189 0.240 0.214 0.110 
(143) Min. 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 0.593 0.812 0.762 0.529 
      
2009 Mean 0.187 0.223 0.218 0.113 
(138) Min. 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 0.537 0.8125 0.667 0.529 
      
2010 Mean 0.186 0.224 0.216 0.113 
(136) Min. 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 0.481 0.8125 0.714 0.529 
      
2011 Mean 0.188 0.233 0.216 0.111 
(102) Min. 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 0.519 0.875 0.714 0.529 
      
Kruskal-Wallis rank test Chi-squared 0.052 P-value 0.997 
Note: 
 * Individual intellectual capital component score is defined as the ratio of individual component items 
disclosed to the maximum possible number of disclosure items applicable to each component. 
 ** In Stata programme, a normal distribution will have a kurtosis of 3.00. Some other statistical 
software, report a value for kurtosis that is the actual value of kurtosis minus three so that a normal 
distribution would have a value of zero (Acock, 2008).  
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the average IC score for total 519 firm-years is 18.7% 
with a wide range from maximum score of 59.3% to minimum 0 score. The average 
IC scores of individual components are 23.0% (human capital), 21.6% (relational 
capital) and 11.2% (structural capital), respectively. The descriptive statistics results 
indicate that the average levels of overall intellectual capital as well as individual 
components disclosure are low. This is not a surprise compared to the results in prior 
studies (e.g. Bontis, 2003; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Nurunnabi et al., 2011). The reasons 
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for these low levels of disclosure may be that firms are assumed to disclose voluntary 
information only when benefits outweigh costs. Additional disclosure imposes cost 
burdens and high proprietary costs to the firm (Verrecchia, 1983). Second, some firms 
may choose to disclose additional information on their websites (Gandia, 2003) or via 
conference calls (Frankel et al., 1999).  
For individual component, consistent with Beck (1964) and Sveiby (1997) that human 
capital is the most influential intellectual capital component, human capital shows the 
highest average score of 23%. However, inconsistent with the theoretical arguments 
made by Freeman (1982) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) regarding the importance of 
structural capital, structural capital has the lowest average score of 11.2%. There are 
two possible reasons to explain the lowest level of structural capital disclosure. First, 
most of the structural capital information is considered as “corporate secret”. The 
competiveness of the firm might be hindered by the disclosure of too much 
information as it might reveal the confidential information to the competitors 
(Verrecchia, 1983). Second, some items in structural capital are subject to the 
mandatory requirement under NZ IAS 38 (e.g. IP, R&D and IT). They are no longer 
regarded as voluntary disclosure according to the scoring procedure of this thesis. 
In Panel B of Table 4, the number of observations decreases from 143 in 2008 to 102 
in 2011. The number of observations in 2011 is far less than other years because some 
2011 annual reports have not been released on the cut-off date for data collection. The 
decreasing trend of the number of observations for 2008 to 2010 (from 143-136) 
might be explained by a number of corporate collapses during this period. New 
Zealand entered to economic recession period in early 2008 (Mills, 2010). Consistent 
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with this trend, the NZX database shows that there are 13 companies delisted in 2008, 
11 companies delisted in 2009 and 26 companies delisted in 2010. The average overall 
IC score decreases yearly from 0.189 in 2008 to the lowest point of 0.186 in 2010, but 
rises again in 2011 to 0.188. A Kruskal-Wallis rank test shows that there are no 
significant difference at the 5% level among the level of IC score across the four-year 
period (P-value >0.05). It means that macroeconomic factors such as the recession 
impact do not have influence on the level of intellectual capital disclosure during the 
examining period. In addition, the average IC score for individual component for each 
year is very close to the average IC score for individual component for the whole 
period [e.g. the average IC score of relational capital disclosure for the 4-year period 
is 0.216, which is similar to the average IC scores of this disclosure in 2008 (0.214), 
2009 (0.218), 2010 (0.216) and 2011 (0.216)]. The constant level of intellectual 
capital disclosure over the four-year period indicates that although there is no 
regulated framework for intellectual capital reporting across firms, it seems that 
individual firms may disclose their intellectual capital information systematically 
across the study period.  
Table 5 presents the disclosure frequency of each intellectual capital item among 519 
firm-years.    
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Table 5 Disclosure frequency of individual intellectual capital items 
Human capital Percentage* Relational capital Percentage* Structural capital Percentage* 
1 Photos and ages of directors  58.19% 17 Customer relations 42.20% 38 Lists of intellectual property (IP) 34.87% 
2 Backgrounds of directors  70.13% 18 Identification of customer groups  33.53% 39 Features of IP  19.85% 
3 Comments on directors  10.79% 19 Customer relation maintenance  37.38% 40 Internal generated IP 1.54% 
4 Members of top management 33.72% 20 Acquisition of new customers  6.94% 41 Information technology (IT) system  13.29% 
5 Backgrounds of top management  26.01% 21 Customer feedback 11.18% 42 Breakdown of IT costs 4.24% 
6 Comments on top management 18.30% 22 Supplier relations  8.09% 43 Online management and trading  10.02% 
7 Employee statistics 27.94% 23 Leading suppliers  1.93% 44 Investment in IT 8.67% 
8 Changes in employee structure  16.96% 24 Comments on suppliers  1.35% 45 Corporate philosophy  27.75% 
9 Comments on employees 24.86% 25 Investors relations  26.01% 46 Information and knowledge sharing  6.94% 
10 Training policy  18.11% 26 Partnerships  27.55% 47 Flexibilities and organisation learning 10.60% 
11 Training activities  7.13% 27 Comments on partnerships  15.99% 48 General discussion of R&D activities  9.63% 
12 Recruitment  6.17% 28 Favourite contracts 29.87% 49 R&D investment 3.66% 
13 Health and safety policies  16.96% 29 Comments on favourite contracts  16.96% 50 R&D centres and research partnerships  5.97% 
14 Employee motivations 16.96% 30 Other stakeholders  17.15% 51 R&D activities 14.64% 
15 Employee communication 7.90% 31 Social policies 26.59% 52 Future prospects of R&D  5.01% 
16 Other disclosure 7.71% 32 Environmental policies  28.90% 53 R&D output  9.25% 
    33 Market reputation and presence  44.51% 54 Feedback 4.05% 
    34 Brand and specification 27.17% 
 
  
    35 Awards and achievements  14.64% 
 
  
    36 Advertising and promotion  13.49% 
 
  
    37 New services  21.77%     
      Note: * Percentage is the number of firm-years disclose a particular item divided by total number of firm-years (519). A higher percentage means more firms choose to disclose a particular item 
in their annual reports. The disclosure frequency means the frequency of an item appeared in all annual report (not the frequency of an item appeared in one annual report). 
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With regards to the nature and extent of intellectual capital disclosure, one of the most 
significant findings is that most of intellectual capital information is expressed in 
narrative rather than numerical terms. This is consistent with the findings from prior 
research that given the nature of intellectual capital, it is difficult for firms to quantify 
such information (e.g. Garcia-Meca et al., 2005).  As a result of the lack of 
quantitative measures of intellectual capital, most of intellectual capital disclosure 
aims at describing rather than valuing a particular item or process. Items 11 (training), 
44 (IT), and 49 (R&D) are designed to capture both qualitative and voluntary 
quantitative intellectual capital information. Scoring in those items means that firms 
may disclose additional quantitative information besides the mandatory quantitative 
disclosure.  However, Table 5 illustrates that only a few firms disclose voluntary 
quantitative information regarding training costs (7.13%), IT investment (8.67%) and 
R&D investment (3.66%).  
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Bontis, 2003), there is no 
widely accepted structure for firms to disclose intellectual capital information. Table 5 
reveals that there is a large variation in firms’ selection of items reported in the annual 
reports.  The percentage of firm-years to disclose a specific item reaches as high as 
70.13% (backgrounds of directors) to the lowest level of 1.35% (comments on 
suppliers).  
Within human capital disclosure, item 1 (photos and ages of directors) and 2 
(backgrounds of directors) are the two most frequently disclosed items. Around 58% 
and 70% of the firm-years disclosed these two items in their annual reports. They are 
also the two most frequently disclosed items among all intellectual capital terms. 
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These results imply that the quality of directors is the most valuable intellectual 
capital for New Zealand firms. This finding is consistent with the theoretical argument 
that the board of directors is the most important decision making device for the firm 
(e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, it is possible that the higher level of 
disclosure regarding the board of directors is influenced by the disclosure requirement 
relating to the compliance of the Code. The Code sets out that “director should 
undertake appropriate training to remain current on how to best perform their duties as 
directors of an issuer” (The Code 2.4). In addition, the Principle 2 of the Principle and 
Guidelines suggest that the directors “should be a balance of independence, skills, 
knowledge,   experience, and perspectives among directors so that the board works 
effectively”. These encourage firms to have and disclose qualified directors. Finally, 
other human capital items such as item 4 (members of top management), 7 (employee 
statistics) and 5 (backgrounds of top management) are also highly frequently 
mentioned terms. 
With regard to relational capital, market reputation and presence (item 33) is the most 
frequently disclosed item (44.51%), followed by customer relations (item 17, 42.2%), 
customer relation maintenance (item 19, 37.38%), customer groups (item 18, 33.53%) 
and favourite contracts (item 28, 29.87%). These results imply that, for relational 
capital, marketing reputation and customer-related capital are two of the fundamental 
factors determining organisational success for New Zealand firms. On the other hand, 
there are a small number of firms commenting their suppliers on the annual reports 
(item 24). This item is the least reported item among all intellectual capital terms 
(1.35%).  
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The frequency of structural capital items is relatively low compared to that within the 
other two categories. Consistent with Guthrie and Petty (2000) and Bontis (2003), the 
results show that intellectual property is the most frequently disclosed structural 
capital item. Further, most of the items within structural capital category can only be 
found in less than 10% of the corporate annual reports (10 out of 17 items). As 
discussed above, high proprietary costs and the overlap with mandatory requirements 
of NZ IAS 38 are the two possible explanations for the low disclosure level of 
structural capital.   
6.1.2 Descriptive statistics of other variables 
In Table 6, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of board structure and ownership 
concentration variables. The table shows that board size of the sample ranges from 3 
to 12, with an average of 6 directors and standard deviation of 1.767. As mentioned 
earlier, the NZX Listing Rule 3.3.1 (a) requires that the minimum number of directors 
shall be three for each issuer. The compliance rate of New Zealand listed firms for the 
Rule 3.3.1 (a) is 100%.  
In terms of board independence, the table shows that the average percentage of 
independent directors on the board is 0.606, with minimum 0% and maximum 100% 
independence rate. Not all listed firms comply with the mandatory requirement 
regarding independent directors. First, the Rule 10.5.5 (j) requires issuers to include a 
statement as to which of its directors are independent directors and which of them are 
not in their annual reports. However, the results show that 64 out of 519 (12.33%) 
firm-years did not comply with this rule. Second, among 455 firm-years that have 
complied with 10.5.5 (j), 8 (see Note* in Table 6) out of 455 did not meet minimum 
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number of two independent directors or three if there are eight or more directors (or 
one –third of the total number of directors, whichever is the greater) under 3.3.1 (c).   
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of other variables 
Panel A : Board structure and ownership concentration variables 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Brdsize 519 5.830 1.767 6 3 12  
Brdindp* 455 0.606 0.203 0.6 0 1 
Brdfemale** 502 0.073 0.120 0 0 0.5 
OC 519 0.166 0.178 0.093 0.000 0.846 
Panel B : Value relevance variables 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
P 512 1.936 3.468 0.945 0.001 32 
E 519 0.076 0.368 0.036 -1.792 3.682 
BV 519 1.456 2.119 0.913 -1.400 16.873 
Panel C (I) : Control variables 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Firm size 519 18.660 2.608 18.821 10.127 27.379 
Leverage 519 0.888 7.299 0.474 0.002 163.12 
Profitability 519 -0.078 7.908 0.054 -103.218 118.121 
Listing age 519 15.266 13.922 11 0 107 
Panel C (II) : Control variables (dummy variables) 
 Group Obs. Percentage 
Industry type Low Tech 256 49.33% 
 High Tech 263 50.67% 
International listing status Single Market 429 82.66% 
 Multi-listing 90 17.34% 
Note:  
*2 firm-years clearly indicated that the company had no independent director in their annual reports. 3 
firm-years disclosed that the firm only had 1independent director. 3 firm-years had less than 3 
independent directors while there were 8 (or more) directors on the board. 64 (519 minus 455) firm-
years did not report any information regarding board independence in their annual reports.  
**66.14% (332 out of 502) of the boards (disclosed gender information) have zero female directors (i.e. 
around 34% of the boards have at least one female director).  
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 6, the average percentage of female directors on the 
board is 7.3%, with minimum 0 and maximum 50%. Around 34% (see Note ** in 
Table 6) of firm-years have at least one female director on the board. This number is 
slightly lower than other developed countries [e.g. Australia, average 8.7%, 50% at 
least one female on the board; Europe, average 8%, 62% at least one female on the 
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board in Adams and Ferreira (2009)]. However, these higher percentages among 
Australian and European firms might be due to the fact that the statistics are only 
based on large companies [Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 and top 200 
companies in Europe]. As the evidence showed in Carter et al. (2003), the number of 
female directors on the board is positively related to the firm size. 
The ownership concentration of sample firms varies greatly from 0.000 to 0.846. The 
mean ownership concentration is 0.166.  Slightly different from previous argument 
that the ownership of New Zealand firms are highly concentrated (e.g. Hossain et al., 
2001), the results show evidence of a moderate concentration according to Brown and 
Warren-Boulton’s (1988) concentration benchmark for New Zealand listed firms.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of value relevance variables. The 
mean and median of share price, earnings per share and book value per share are 
1.936 (0.945), 0.076 (0.036), and 1.456 (0.913), respectively.   
Panel C (I) presents that sample firm-years are widely distributed in terms of firm size, 
leverage, profitability and listing age. In Panel C (II) of Table 6, the percentages of 
low-tech and high-tech companies are 49.33% and 50.67%, respectively. 82.66% of 
sample firm-years are listed on a single capital market and 17.34% of those firm-years 
are listed on more than one capital markets.    
Table 7 reports the correlation coefficients of the board structure and ownership 
concentration variables. As expected, OC and OC2 are strongly related. This is 
consistent with the findings in Makhija and Patton (2004). In addition, Brdfemale is 
significantly positively related to Brdsize (P<0.01). This implies that large boards are 
more likely to have more female directors.  These significant correlation coefficients 
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may cause multicollinearity problem in the multiple regression analysis. However, 
according to Makhija and Patton (2004), the influence of multicollinearity on the 
significance of the coefficients is not an issue because multicollinearity biases the t-
statistics downward. 
Table 7 Correlation analysis of the board structure and ownership concentration 
variables 
Variables  
Brdsize 
(P-value) 
Brdindp 
(P-value) 
Brdfemale 
(P-value) 
OC 
(P-value) 
OC2 
(P-value) 
      Brdsize 1 
    
Brdindp 
0.015  
(0.664)  1 
   
Brdfemale 
0.125 
(0.001)* 
0.007 
(0.876) 1 
  
OC 
-0.076 
(0.145) 
-0.024 
(0.542) 
-0.089 
 (0.091)** 1 
 
OC2 
-0.093 
(0.131)** 
0.032 
(0.546) 
-0.087 
(0.088) 
0.951 
(0.000)* 1 
Note:  
* and **represent statistical significance at 1% and 10% levels.  
See table 3 for the definitions of variables 
 
6.2 The level of intellectual capital disclosure  
6.2.1 Univariate tests 
A number of univariate tests are conducted to test the relationship between IC score 
and board structure and ownership concentration variables. The sample is divided into 
two groups according to the median of each examining factor (except OC test dividing 
sample into four groups). Both t-test and Mann-Whitney (MW) test are conducted to 
compare means of IC score of two groups. The results of these univariate tests of the 
hypotheses relating to the level of intellectual capital are presented in Table 8. 
According to skewness and kurtosis figures showed in Table 4, the pattern of 
intellectual capital disclosure does not show a normal distribution. Therefore the 
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interpretation based on Mann-Whitney test is more accurate. However, Table 8 shows 
that both tests reach the same results. 
Table 8 Results of univariate testing 
 
Consistent with the expectations, both t-test and MW test results show that IC score is 
significant higher for the firms with a larger board, higher percentage of independent 
directors, and higher percentage of female directors, respectively. These results 
provide strong evidence to support H1a, H2a and H3a (p<0.01). 
It is expected that there is a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration 
and IC score. The sample is divided into two groups (lower and higher group) 
according to its median. Each group is further divided into two sub-groups by using 
25% percentile for lower group, and 75% percentile for higher group. For the lower 
group, strong evidence shows that IC score is significantly higher for the firm with 
higher ownership concentration level. For the higher group, however, the comparison 
Group Group Threshold N Mean S.D. Hypotheses T-test MW  
Dependent variable: IC score 
      Brdsize 0 <6 221 0.135 0.102 0<1 -8.314* -7.007* 
  1 >=6 298 0.226 0.147 
   Brdindp 0 <0.6 218 0.170 0.114 0<1 -4.879* -4.151* 
  1 >=0.6 237 0.230 0.148 
   Brdfemale 0 =0 331 0.168 0.129 0<1 -5.05* -5.022* 
  1 >0 171 0.234 0.140 
   OC low 0 0<OC<0.035** 129 0.144 0.118 0<1 -4.081* -4.103* 
 
1 0.035<=OC<0.093** 131 0.208 0.134 
   OC high 0 0.093<=OC<0.249** 130 0.199 0.148 0>1 0.010 -0.228 
 
1 0.249=<OC 129 0.198 0.138 
   Note:  
*represents  statistical significance at 1% level 
  **0.035, 0.093 and 0.249 are 25%, median and 75% percentiles, respectively. 
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of mean IC score is not significant between high and low concentration sub-groups (t-
test= 0.010 and MW test=-0.228). Therefore, H4a is only partially supported. 
6.2.2 Multivariate tests  
The multiple regression results are reported in Table 9 (column Model 1). Model 1 
produces an adjust R2 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that gender diversity is positively related to the level of 
disclosure. The results show that the coefficient of Brdfemale is positive (0.043), 
however, the relationship between Brdfemale and IC score is not significant (t-
statistics=0.89). The empirical results fail to support H3a. These results may be caused 
by the low average of female directors on board across New Zealand. In New Zealand, 
more than 50% of the board do not have female directors on board.  
of 0.240. Hypotheses 1a and 2a expect positive associations 
between board size, board independence and the level of intellectual capital  
disclosure. Consistent with the univariate tests results and hypotheses, both board size 
(H1a)  and board independence (H2a) are positively and significantly related to IC 
score, supported by strong evidence (P<0.01). These results indicate that firms with a 
larger board and a higher level of board independence disclose higher level of 
intellectual capital disclosure. 
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Table 9 Multiple regression analysis on the association between board structure, ownership concentration on the level of intellectual capital 
Variables Expected 
sign 
Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics 
  Model 1: Total IC score Model 2 Human capital Model 3 Relational capital Model 4 Structural capital 
Intercept ? -0.298* -5.45 -0.602* -7.87 -0.323* -4.46 0.019 0.35 
Brdsize + 0.018* 3.97 0.015** 2.41 0.026* 4.51 0.009** 2.04 
Brdindp + 0.159* 5.45 0.183* 4.72 0.190* 4.91 0.089* 3.06 
Brdfemale + 0.043 0.89 0.039 0.59 0.096 1.52 -0.020 -0.42 
OC + 0.278* 2.75 0.487* 3.43 0.389* 2.89 -0.055 -0.54 
OC2 - -0.333** -2.05 -0.516** -2.27 -0.478** -2.22 0.019 0.12 
Firmsize ? 0.014* 4.14 0.030* 6.58 0.013* 2.88 -0.001 -0.22 
Leverage + 0.006 0.58 -0.004 -0.28 0.018  1.29 0.001 0.11 
Profitability ? 0.000 -0.12 0.000 0.21 -0.000 -0.16 -0.000 -0.39 
Listing Age - 0.000 0.81 0.000 1.25 -0.000 -0.07 0.000 1.04 
Industries + 0.007 0.59 0.033** 2.01 -0.018 -1.15 0.013 1.11 
Intstatus + -0.004 -0.24 -0.028 -1.21 -0.002 -0.1 0.016 0.98 
          
No. of obs.  450  450  450  450  
𝑅2  0.259  0.2881  0.236  0.061  
𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅2  0.240  0.270  0.217  0.037  
F-value  13.88  16.11  12.3  2.58  
F sig.  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  
Note:  
(1)The table reports multiple regression results of the following model (RI): 
𝐼𝐶 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛽3 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑂𝐶 + 𝛽5 𝑂𝐶2 +  𝛽6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽11 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 +  𝜀 
Model 2, 3 and 4 replace total IC score with human capital, relational capital and structural capital (see Table 4 for the measurement of individual components) 
(2)Table 3 presents the description and measurement of each variable 
(3)*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 4a predicts the non-linear relationship between ownership concentration 
and the level of intellectual capital disclosure. There is strong evidence for this 
relationship between ownership concentration and IC score. The coefficient of OC is 
positive and it becomes negative for OC2, which means that the higher the ownership 
concentration, the greater the level of intellectual capital disclosure, but when 
ownership concentration reaches to a certain level, the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure reduces as ownership concentration continuous to increase. Both 
coefficients of OC and OC2
Among all chosen control variables, only firm size is significantly and positively 
(coefficient= 0.014; t-statistics= 4.14) related to IC score at the 1% level. Other 
control variables such as leverage, profitability, listing age, industry type and 
international listing status are not significantly associated with IC score.  These results 
are in line with those obtained in Ho and Wong (2001) (leverage), Garcia-Meca et al. 
(2005) (leverage, profitability, industry type and international listing status), Hidalgo 
et al. (2011) (profitability), Whiting and Woodcock (2011) (listing age). The non-
significance of leverage, profitability, and listing age might be caused by the mixed 
effects of those factors on the level of disclosure. For example, highly leveraged firms 
are motivated to disclose additional information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, extra disclosure may be costly so that those firms are reluctantly to bear the 
costs of additional disclosure. For profitability, as discussed earlier, although 
managers are motivated to disclose additional information to support the quality of 
earnings in high performance year (Singhvi and Desai, 1971), some information may 
be protected because it contains corporate secret (Williams, 2001). In terms of listing 
 are significant (P<1% and P<5%, respectively), therefore, 
H4a are strongly supported.  
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age, some firms with long history may also be large firms, so that they are more 
motivated to disclose additional information. As a result, the negative effects of listing 
age (discussed in section 5.3.1) might be cancelled out by this effect. The non-
significance of industry type indicates that the concept and importance of intellectual 
capital have not been recognised by the majority of New Zealand firms.  This is 
consistent with the conclusion drawn in Guthrie and Petty (2000) and Bontis (2003). 
Further, the sign of coefficient of international listing status is opposite to the 
expectation (coefficient= -0.004). The reason for this might be that the expectation 
that firms that are listed on foreign capital market with higher level of voluntary 
disclosure only holds when a company is listed on the capital market with tougher 
rules. In other words, companies that are listed on foreign stock exchanges with less 
stringent regulation are not expected to disclose more information.  
In short, the multiple regression results suggest that consistent with hypotheses H1a, 
H2a, and H4a, larger firms with a larger board, more independent directors and higher 
ownership concentration disclose more intellectual capital information, however, once 
ownership concentration reaches to a high level, it will hinder the level of disclosure. 
Factors such as gender diversity of boards and control variables including leverage, 
profitability, listing age, industry type and international listing status have no 
significant influence on the level of intellectual capital disclosure.   
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6.2.3 The level of intellectual capital disclosure: individual components 
analysis 
Further tests are conducted to examine the impact of board structure factors and 
ownership concentration on individual intellectual capital components. The results are 
presented in Table 9 (Models 2 to 4).  
First of all, Model 2 (human capital) produces the highest adjust R2 (0.270), whereas 
Model 4 (structural capital) has the lowest adjust R2 (0.037). These results indicate 
that board structure and ownership concentration have stronger association with 
human capital disclosure than with other types of intellectual capital disclosure. As 
mentioned earlier, some factors cause difficulties to capture the full information of a 
firm’s structural capital: (1) some items in structural capital are subject to the 
mandatory requirement of NZ IAS 38; and (2) there is a need to protect firm-specific 
knowledge to maintain a firm’s competiveness. These may explain the lowest adjusted 
R2
Second, the coefficients of both Brdsize and Brdindp are positive and significant in all 
models. These results confirm that board size and independence are fundamental 
factors determining a firm’s disclosure level and strategies relating the overall 
intellectual capital as well as its individual components. In addition, the coefficients of 
board size, independence are the highest in relational capital model (Model 3). The 
results indicate that larger boards and the inclusion of more independent directors 
have more business connections with external partners and markets. Moreover, Model 
2 (human capital) reveal that board independence also plays an important role on 
human capital disclosure and strategy (coefficient= 0.183, p<0.01). It implies that 
 of structural capital model (Model 4).  
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firms with more independent board might have better recognition of the importance of 
human capital, engage more activities to improve employee competence. In other 
words, combining with the items in the disclosure index, those firms provider better 
training opportunities, health and safety policies and communication system. 
Furthermore, the results show that board gender diversity does not have any 
significant influence on any types of intellectual capital. 
Third, the sign and significance for the coefficients of ownership concentration, firm 
size and other control variables are similar and consistent with the expectations in all 
models except for Model 4 (structural capital). Model 2 (human capital) has the 
largest coefficients of OC, and Firm size (0.487 and 0.030), which means that higher 
OC and larger firms are more likely to disclose more human capital than other types 
of intellectual capital. However, when OC reaches a high level, it has more negative 
impacts on the level of human capital disclosure (and the strategies relating to human 
capital).     
6.3 The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure 
6.3.1 Board structure, ownership concentration and the value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure 
Table 10 presents the multiple regression results for three value relevance models: 
model without board structure and ownership concentration factors [RII (1), Model 5], 
model without interaction terms [RII (2), Model 6], and the full model [R II (3), 
Model 7]. As stated in Barth et al. (2007), higher explanatory power of the regression 
can be interpreted as evidence of more value relevance. As expected, the full model 
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(Model 7) produces the highest adjust R2
In addition, consistent with prior value relevance literature (e.g. Collins et al, 1997 
and others), both earnings and book value of equity are positively and significantly 
related to share price (in all three models). These results confirm that those two 
accounting variables are fundamental factors to explain a firm’s market value for the 
New Zealand context. Further, Model 7 (full model) shows that board gender diversity 
has a significant positive impact on the firm market value (coefficient= 2.22, p<0.05). 
This is consistent with Carter et al. (2003), who find the positive influence of board 
gender diversity on a firm’s market value. Moreover, the regression results confirm 
that control variables such as firm size, leverage and industry type are significantly 
and positively associated with a firm’s market value.  
 among all three models [Model 5 (0.806), 
Model 6 (0.819) and Model 7 (0.821)]. It indicates that the inclusion of board and 
ownership concentration factors and interaction terms improves the explanatory power 
of reported information on the market value of a firm.  
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Table 10 Board structure, ownership concentration and the value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure 
Variables Coefficients T-
statistics 
Coefficients T-
statistics 
Coefficients T-
statistics 
 Model 5: Full model 
without board structure 
and OC factors[RII(1)] 
Model 6 : Full model 
without interaction 
terms[RII(2)] 
Model 7 : Full 
model[RII(3)] 
Intercept -2.466* -4.04 -3.192* -4.11 -1.618  -1.61 
E 1.714* 7.04 1.697* 6.47 1.717* 6.52 
BV 1.144* 24.21 1.157* 23.06 1.154* 23.09 
IC 1.567* 2.79 1.068*** 1.66 -7.242** -2.25 
Firmsize 0.106* 3.00 0.076  1.61 0.090*** 1.91 
Lev 0.140  1.49 0.285** 2.05 0.289** 2.09 
Industries 0.623* 4.57 0.582* 3.76 0.498* 3.18 
Brdsize   0.076 1.28 -0.131 -1.36 
Brdindp   0.975** 2.40 -0.090 -0.12 
Brdfemale   1.690* 2.62 2.22** 2.02 
OC   1.537 1.13 2.283 0.93 
OC2   -3.192 -1.47 -4.493 -1.09 
Brdsize*IC     0.925* 2.74 
Brdindp*IC     4.915  1.60 
Brdfemale*IC     -3.241 -0.65 
OC*IC     -6.527 -0.59 
OC2*IC     9.754 0.53 
       
No. of obs. 512  444  444  
𝑅2 0.808  0.823  0.827  
𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅2 0.806  0.819  0.821  
F-value 353.95  182.72  127.98  
F sig. 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note: 
 (1) The table reports multiple regression results of the following models: 
Model 5 RII(1):  𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖 
Model 6 RII(2):  𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝛾7𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾8 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛾9𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛾10 𝑂𝐶 +  𝛾11𝑂𝐶2 +  𝜖 
Model 7 RII(3): Pit= 𝛾0 +  𝛾1 𝐸𝑖 +  𝛾2 𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾5 𝐿𝑒𝑣 +  𝛾6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝛾7 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛾8 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 +  𝛾9 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛾10 𝑂𝐶 +  𝛾11 𝑂𝐶2 +  𝛾12 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 +  𝛾13 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 ∗
𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾14 𝐵𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾15 𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 + 𝛾16 𝑂𝐶2 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 +  𝜖 
 (2) *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
With regard to the value relevance of intellectual capital, Model 5 and Model 6 
confirm that intellectual capital disclosure has a significant positive impact on a firm’s 
market value.  However, the evidence becomes weaker after more variables enter into 
the regression (1% significance in Model 5 and 10% significance in Model 6). 
Furthermore, the coefficient of IC score becomes significantly negative in the full 
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model (Model 7). It means that higher level of intellectual capital disclosure lowers 
firm value after corporate governance factors enter into the regression. Although 
unexpected, this result is not surprising. In Habib and Azim (2008) and Veltri and 
Silvestri (2011), the coefficients of accounting variables reduce while more variables 
are added to the model. In addition, a negative impact of intellectual  
capital/intangible disclosure has also been observed in some studies (e.g. Cazavan-
Jeny and Jeanjean, 2006). The inverse relationship might be due to the special nature 
of intellectual capital information. Increased level of intellectual capital disclosure can 
be two-edged sword. Because of the proprietary costs discussed in Verrecchia (1983), 
although increased disclosure improves the ability of shareholders and directors to 
monitor their managers, the additional information might also reveal confidential 
information to the competitors. As such, a company loses its competitiveness, which 
may consequently hinder its future earnings potential. 
To test the hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b, following the testing methods in 
Habib and Azim (2008), if a factor has a positive and significant impact on the value 
relevance of the information, the coefficient of interaction term of these two (factor 
and information) will be positive and significant.  In Model 7, of all examining  
factors, only the coefficient of Brdsize-IC score interaction term is positive and 
significant (coefficient = 0.925 and p-value < 0.01). This means that only board size 
has a positive impact on the creditability of intellectual capital disclosure. Therefore, 
only H1b is verified.  
The coefficient of Brdindp interaction term is positive but insignificant. Therefore, 
H2b is not supported. According to Osterloh and Frey (2006), only insiders can 
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evaluate firm-specific knowledge generation and transformation. Outsiders, on the 
other hand, do not have sufficient relevant knowledge. They can only make decisions 
based on the information supplied by insiders. In addition, they also argue that 
outsider directors focus on the financial consequences of investment rather than the 
evaluation of the quality of knowledge process itself. Therefore, there is a limitation 
for independent directors’ ability to improve the credibility of firm-specific 
knowledge disclosure. This might explain the non-significant coefficient of Brdindp 
interaction term. The coefficient of gender diversity interaction term is negative and 
insignificant, thus H3b is not supported.  
H4b predicts the association between ownership concentration and the value relevance 
of intellectual capital. In Table 10, Model 7 shows that the directions of coefficient of 
OC and OC2
To some extent, these results confirm the argument made in Marston and Shrives 
(1991) that the quantity of information cannot be used as proxy for information 
quality. The findings indicate that higher level of disclosure does not necessarily have 
a positive impact on the quality of disclosed information.  
 are contradictory to the expectation and are non-significant, which means 
that ownership concentration level does not have any impact on the value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure. Therefore, H4b is not supported. 
 
112 
 
6.3.2 The value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure: Individual 
components analysis 
Table 11 presents the value relevance analysis for individual intellectual capital 
components: human capital (Model 8), relational capital (Model 9) and structural 
capital (Model 10). Model 8 (human capital) produces the highest adjust R2 of 0.830 
among all models including main model and structural capital model has the lowest 
adjusted R2
  
 of 0.817. This implies that human capital disclosure is the most efficient 
indicator for firm market value estimation. This is consistent with Veltri and Silverstri 
(2011), who provide empirical evidence that human capital is more value relevant to 
investors than any other type of intellectual capital.  
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Table 11 The value relevance of intellectual capital: Individual components analysis 
Variables Coefficients T-
statistics 
Coefficients T-
statistics 
Coefficients T-
statistics 
 Model 8 : Human 
capital 
Model 9: Relation 
capital 
Model 10 : Structural 
capital 
Intercept -1.448 -1.59 -2.031** -2.08 -3.284* -3.62 
E 1.685* 6.51 1.743* 6.60 1.744* 6.65 
BV 1.128* 22.84 1.159* 23.07 1.153* 22.93 
IC -7.338* -3.21 -4.387*** -1.84 -1.852 -0.53 
Firm Size 0.105** 2.16 0.085*** 1.81 0.096** 2.02 
Leverage 0.273** 1.98 0.294** 2.11 0.297** 2.12 
Industries 0.448* 2.85 0.519* 3.28 0.557* 3.55 
Brdsize -0.166*** -1.79 -0.058 -0.64 0.016 0.21 
Brdindp -0.245 -0.37 -0.000 -0.00 1.137** 2.04 
Brdfemale 1.769*** 1.70 2.240** 2.32 2.198** 2.24 
OC 1.882 0.95 2.434 1.05 2.573  1.39 
OC2 -3.417 -1.10 -4.463 -1.14 -4.786  -1.63 
Brdsize*IC 0.859* 3.56 0.516*** 1.96 0.591 1.45 
Brdindp*IC 4.893** 2.42 3.992*** 1.72 -0.688 -0.19 
Brdfemale*IC -0.861 -0.24 -2.788 -0.76 -4.592 -0.67 
OC*IC -4.497 -0.64 -5.388 -0.64 -8.746 -0.79 
OC2*IC 3.779 0.35 7.162 0.51 15.487 0.92 
       
No. of obs. 444  444  444  
𝑅2 0.830  0.826  0.824  
𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅2 0.824  0.819  0.817  
F-value 130.28  126.57  124.49  
F sig. 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note: 
 (1) Model 8, 9 and 10 replace total IC score with human capital, relational capital and structural capital 
in RII (3) (Model 7 in Table 10) (see Table 4 for the measurement of individual components) 
 (2) *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The coefficients of earnings and book value of equity of all models are positive and 
significant. These results are robust to various types of intellectual capital. This is 
consistent with Veltri and Silverstri, 2011, who provide evidence that book value 
equity and earnings are significant regardless the choices of information as “other 
information”.  
In terms of the impact of board structure and ownership concentration on the value 
relevance of individual intellectual capital components, the coefficients of Brdsize and 
Brdindp interaction terms are positive and significant in model 8 and 9 (human capital 
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and relational capital), which means that larger boards and more independent directors 
have a positive impact on the quality of human capital and relational capital  
disclosure.  The value relevance of structural capital disclosure, however, is not 
associated with board structure characteristics. As structural capital comprises mainly 
of internal sharing knowledge of an organisation, this result confirms Osterloh and 
Frey’s (2006) argument that the ability of independent directors to improve the value 
relevance of structural capital might be limited because they do not have sufficient 
firm-specific knowledge. With regard to the general information such as human and 
relational capital, consistent with the expectations, board size and independence 
improve the quality (i.e. value relevance) of information because of the enhanced 
monitoring function of the board. Similar to the main model, board gender diversity 
and ownership concentration do not have any impact on the value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure.  
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Heteroscedasticity is a major concern in regression analysis. Considering that the 
multiple regression models may contain heteroscedasticity residuals, the robustness 
tests for heteroscedasticity are conducted. Overall, the results of the sensitivity 
analysis are quantitatively similar to the main findings.9
                                                          
9 See Appendix C for the results of robust models. 
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6.5 Discussion of key findings 
6.5.1 The level and extent of intellectual capital disclosure  
Consistent with Guthrie and Petty (2000) and Bontis (2003), the average level of 
intellectual capital disclosure for New Zealand listed companies is low, and there is no 
established universally accepted framework for intellectual capital reporting. The 
average disclosure level remains constant during the period from 2008 to 2011. 
Despite the low average of the overall intellectual capital disclosure level, evidence 
shows that items related to human capital, especially the information related to the 
board of directors are most frequently disclosed. These results confirm the importance 
of the board in corporate decision making process proposed by Fama and Jensen 
(1983). However, this high disclosure level may be partially driven by the requirement 
of the NZX Listing Rules regarding the disclosure of the compliance of the Code. On 
the other hand, the results reveal that the average disclosure level of structural capital 
is the lowest among three individual components. The reason for this could be that 
firms have attempted to avoid the proprietary costs by limiting the disclosure to the 
mandatory level. Again, consistent with Guthrie and Petty (2000) and Bontis (2003), 
intellectual property is the most frequently structural capital item.  
6.5.2 Board structure, ownership concentration and the level of intellectual 
capital disclosure  
This thesis provides strong evidence that board size and independence have a 
significant positive impact on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. Consistent 
with the theoretical argument made by Fama and Jensen (1983), empirical studies  
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(e.g. Abeysekera, 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Li et al.,2008) 
and H1a and H2a, the results indicate that firms with a larger board and more 
independent directors on the board exhibit a higher level of intellectual capital 
disclosure.  However, there is only marginal evidence showing that board gender 
diversity positively influences the level of intellectual capital. The univariate tests 
provide strong evidence to support hypothesis 3a. However, in multivariate tests, there 
is no evidence supporting this hypothesis. This might be explained by the low average 
number of females on board in New Zealand firms. Prior studies (e.g. Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009) that find a positive impact of board gender diversity are based on the 
sample comprising only large firms, which have a higher percentage of female 
directors on board.   
Consistent with H4a, the results indicate that the impact of ownership concentration 
on the level of intellectual capital disclosure is positive at the low concentration level 
and becomes negative at the high concentration level. In line with prior research, this 
thesis provides further evidence for the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and the level of intellectual capital disclosure (e.g. Makhija and Patton, 
2004; Jiang and Habib, 2009). 
Further tests show that the significant impact of board structure on the level of 
intellectual capital is robust to various types of the intellectual capital. Board size and 
independence influence the level of all three individual components disclosure in the 
same way as overall intellectual capital disclosure.  Gender diversity has no impact on 
any type of intellectual capital. Ownership concentration has non-linear relationship 
117 
 
with the levels of human and relational capital disclosures, but not that of structural 
capital disclosure. 
6.5.3 Board structure, ownership concentration and the value relevance of 
disclosure 
The results indicate that the explanatory power of regression with board structure and 
ownership concentration variables is higher than the models excluding them.  
According to Barth et al. (2000), the higher explanatory power of the regression (R2
This thesis only provides evidence that board size has a significant positive impact on 
the value relevance of intellectual capital (H1b).  However, Hypotheses H2b, H3b, 
and H4b are not supported. Osterloh and Frey (2006) argue that outsiders may not 
have sufficient firm-specific knowledge. This limits the ability of outsider to improve 
the quality of information. Consistent with this argument, the results of the value 
relevance of individual component disclosure indicates that board independence 
positively relates to the value relevance of human and relational capital disclosure. 
However, board independence is not significantly associated with the value relevance 
of structural capital disclosure, which mainly consists of firm-specific knowledge. In 
regard to other factors such as gender diversity and ownership concentration, there is 
limited empirical research addressing these questions.  
) 
is considered as the evidence of more value relevance. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter presents and discusses the descriptive statistics relating to the intellectual 
capital disclosure and hypothesis testing for the influence of three board structure 
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indicators and ownership concentration on the level and value relevance of intellectual 
capital in New Zealand. The findings show strong evidence that firms with a larger 
board and more independent directors on board disclose a higher level of intellectual 
capital disclosure. There is only marginal evidence that gender diversity is positively 
associated with the level of disclosure. The empirical evidence also supports the non-
linear relationship between ownership concentration and the level of disclosure. In 
regard to the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure, only board size is 
proved to have a positive impact on the value relevance of this disclosure. The next 
chapter provides a summary and discussion of the key findings in relating to the 
research questions. The implications, contributions, limitations and directions for 
future research are also presented in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has investigated the impact of board structure and ownership concentration 
on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure. There has been an 
increased focus in the academic discussion on the importance of intellectual capital 
disclosure in the modern economy. Strategic management researchers indicate that 
intellectual capital plays a significant role in determining a firm’s competiveness and 
it is also an important source of economic value creation (e.g. Barney, 1991; 
Goldfinger, 1997). In addition, capital markets research literature reveals that the 
association between financial information under traditional accounting and market 
value in the new knowledge-based economy has declined (e.g. Lev and Zarowin, 1999; 
Francis and Schipper, 1999). This increased gap between a firm’s book and market 
values can be explained by the intellectual capital that is not recognised in firm’s 
financial statements (Brennan and Connell, 2000). Despite the growing recognition of 
the importance of intellectual capital, there is limited research on how intellectual 
capital disclosure is related to corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
structure and ownership concentration, especially based on the post-IFRS adoption 
data and in the New Zealand context. Motivated by those factors, two key research 
questions have been addressed: (1) do board structure and ownership concentration 
have any impact on the level of intellectual capital disclosure?, and (2) do board 
structure and ownership concentration have any impact on the value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure? In this chapter, section 7.1 summaries the key findings 
in relation to the research questions are provided. Section 7.2 and 7.3 provide the 
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implications and major contributions of this thesis. Finally, section 7.4 concludes this 
chapter with a discussion of the limitations of this thesis and directions for future 
research.  
7.1 Summary and discussion of findings 
Chapter two examines the conceptual issues surrounding intellectual capital and the 
characteristics of New Zealand corporate governance systems in relation to board 
structure and ownership concentration. The issues relating to intellectual capital 
include the definition and classification of intellectual capital. It is shown that there is 
absence of a mutually agreed framework to define and classify the intellectual capital 
among accounting professions and academics. As a result, intellectual capital is 
expressed by different terms, defined in various ways and classified into different 
categories in the literature and accounting standards. In regard to corporate 
governance systems in New Zealand, the recent changes in the NZX Listing Rules in 
relation to the minimum requirements of board size and board independence may 
shape the board structure of New Zealand listed firms. In addition, it is argued that 
New Zealand does not have any statutory takeover code and strong protection for 
minority shareholders. Therefore, the ownership concentration level among New 
Zealand firms should be higher than other countries. Further, the less stringent 
regulatory environment in New Zealand provides a unique opportunity to observe the 
relationship between board structure, ownership concentration and intellectual capital 
disclosure.  
 Chapter three provides a review of both theoretical arguments and empirical work in 
relation to the intellectual capital disclosure and the effect of board structure and 
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ownership concentration on the level and value relevance of intellectual capital 
disclosure. This chapter has identified a few gaps in prior research. First, there is a 
limited research on intellectual capital disclosure in the post-IFRS adoption period and 
in the New Zealand context. As a result of the absence of regulation, intellectual 
capital disclosure is more likely affected by firm-specific and country-specific factors. 
Therefore, a country-specific study is needed. In addition, the mandatory NZ IFRSs 
adoption in 2007 may influence the disclosure of intellectual capital by firms because 
there are some significant changes from the old GAAP to NZ IFRS. Second, much of 
empirical research investigating the impact of board structure and ownership 
concentration on the level of intellectual capital disclosure is based on small samples, 
which may not be sufficient to capture the overall impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the level of disclosure. Further, no prior studies have investigated the 
impact of board gender diversity on the level and value relevance of intellectual 
capital disclosure. Finally, there is limited literature addressing the impact of board 
structure and ownership concentration on the quality of intellectual capital disclosure.  
Given the limitations of the extant disclosure research, based on an application of 
agency theory, cost-benefit theory and value relevance approach, chapter four 
develops hypotheses to examine the research questions. Three aspects of board 
structure are expected to have linear relationship with the level and value relevance of 
intellectual capital disclosure. Indicators such as board size, board independence and 
gender diversity enhance the monitoring function of the board, and thus are expected 
to have a positive impact on the level and quality of the disclosure. The impact of 
ownership concentration is non-linear because of the mix effect of entrenchment and 
alignment effects at different ownership concentration levels. Therefore, it is expected 
122 
 
that ownership concentration positively relates to the level and quality of intellectual 
capital disclosure at a low level of ownership concentration, and these effects become 
negative when the ownership concentration reaches to a high level. 
Chapter five describes the research design used to test the hypotheses developed in 
chapter four. The final sample includes 155 New Zealand listed firms covering a total 
of 519 firm-years during the period between 1 January 2008 and 31 August 2011, 
excluding equity trusts and funds entities and the firms without internal management 
team and employees. Chapter five also explains the development of the research 
instruments and models for hypothesis testing, which include a disclosure index and 
multiple regression models.  The measures of all variables used in the model are also 
explained in chapter five.  
The presentation and discussion of empirical results are reported in chapter six. The 
investigation of the level and extent of intellectual capital disclosure reveals that the 
average disclosure level for New Zealand listed firms is low (18.70%). In addition, 
there is no established mutually agreed framework for intellectual capital reporting in 
New Zealand. On closer examination of the extent of the disclosure, the results 
indicate that human capital relating to the quality of the board is most frequently 
disclosed by the firms. On the other hand, it is apparent that firms are reluctant to 
voluntarily disclose information regarding the structural capital except for the 
intellectual property.  
This thesis provides strong evidence of the significant positive impact of board size 
and independence on the level of intellectual capital disclosure. These findings 
confirm that a larger board and higher percentage of independent directors on board 
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enhance the monitoring function of the board. Also, only marginal evidence is 
provided for the positive influence of board gender diversity on the level of disclosure. 
This significant relationship can only be found in the univariate tests. In addition, 
consistent with the expectations, the findings support that ownership concentration 
positively influences the level of disclosure. This relationship becomes negative when 
the ownership concentration reaches to a high level. 
The results of the hypotheses tests in relation to the value relevance of intellectual 
capital disclosure reveal that the inclusion of board structure and ownership 
concentration variables into the regression improves the value relevance of the 
regression model of share price on reported information (indicated by the higher 
adjusted R2 
7.2 Implications 
of the regression). However, in the individual hypotheses tests, only  
board size is proved to have significant influence on the value relevance of the 
intellectual capital disclosure. These results indicate that the quantity of information 
cannot be used as a proxy for the quality of information.   
The findings of this thesis have important implications for regulators, accounting 
standard setting bodies and internal and external information users. First, the results 
confirm that to some extent, better board structure positively influences the level and 
quality of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. As such, in the absence of 
accounting regulations, the reliability and relevance of corporate disclosure can be 
controlled through other types of regulation. From a regulatory perspective, the 
implication is whether the NZX Listing Rules should strengthen the corporate 
governance regulations in relation to board structure. A tougher regulatory 
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environment enhances the quality of corporate disclosure, and more importantly, it 
brings New Zealand in line with the practices of other major stock exchanges (e.g. the 
U.S.). In terms of ownership concentration, as the impact of ownership concentration 
is non-linear, another policy implication is the need for the governance intervention in 
the majority-minority shareholders and shareholder-management relations, in order to 
maintain the ownership concentration for New Zealand firms at an optimum level.   
Second, the results have implications for the New Zealand accounting standards 
setting bodies. The results indicate that the intellectual capital disclosure has some 
associations with the capital markets and it delivers important message to the 
information users. Therefore, there is a need for a standardised framework for 
intellectual capital reporting.  As a result, the intellectual capital reporting will be 
more regulated and more informative to information users. In addition, the disclosure 
based on the same framework can be used for comparison purposes (e.g. industry 
standard and country standard). 
Finally, this thesis confirms that intellectual capital disclosure can be used to estimate 
a firm’s market value. However, information users have to interpret the disclosed 
information with caution. First, intellectual capital is not regulated, so that the quality 
of this information is not guaranteed. Second, the value relevance of the information is 
affected by other firm-specific factors such as board size. Therefore, external 
information users should consider other features related to a firm when decide to using 
this information to estimate the firm’s market value. 
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7.3 Major contributions 
The methodology employed and the evidence presented in this thesis contribute to the 
literature in several ways. First, this is one of the few studies examining the 
intellectual capital disclosure in the post-IFRS adoption period and in the New 
Zealand context. Therefore, this thesis provides an insight into the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and intellectual capital disclosure in a less 
stringent regulatory environment. Also, the examination in this thesis is based on the 
post-IFRS adoption data, which provides the latest evidence in this field. Further, this 
thesis provides a full picture of intellectual capital disclosure behaviour of New 
Zealand firms by investigating the annual reports of all listed firms (excluding certain 
companies).  
Second, this thesis provides strong evidence supporting the positive influence of board 
size, board independence on the level of voluntary disclosure, and non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and the level of disclosure.  In addition, 
moderate evidence of the positive impact of board size and board independence on the 
quality of intellectual capital disclosure is also provided. Further, this thesis extends 
the traditional measures of board structure by examining the association between 
board gender diversity and intellectual capital disclosure, which has not been 
examined in prior research. However, only marginal evidence has been found. Also, 
although gender diversity has not been found to have a positive impact on the value 
relevance of intellectual capital, there are some indications that gender diversity 
improves the level of disclosure and a firm’s market value.  
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Third, much of the literature limits the scope of the study to either the level of 
disclosure or the quality of disclosure. This thesis examines both aspects of the 
intellectual capital disclosure. By adopting the value relevance approach to measure 
the quality of the information, the results confirm the argument made by Marston and 
Shrives (1991) that the quantity of information cannot be used as a proxy for the 
quality of information. Further, this thesis is one of the few studies addressing the 
influence of corporate governance on the value relevance of non-financial voluntary 
information. To some extent, the results confirm that the corporate governance 
structure does not only influence the level of disclosure but also the informativeness 
of disclosure.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature by developing a self-constructed 
intellectual capital disclosure index. Instead of using an existing index, a customised 
disclosure index is design based on a wide range of definitions, classifications and 
indices developed in prior research. The final disclosure index includes most of the 
relevant intellectual capital items and is adjusted for the New Zealand context.  
7.4 Limitations and directions for future research 
The first major limitation is the limitation of the data available in the post-IFRSs 
adoption period. The thesis examines the annual reports released up to 31 August 
2011, which are the most recent annual reports can be collected for this thesis. Future 
research can extend this study when more post-IFRSs adoption data is available.  
Another limitation is that this thesis focuses on a small capital market with less 
stringent rules. Therefore, the generalisability of the results reported in this thesis is 
only limited to the similar jurisdictions.  
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Third, this thesis uses value relevance approach to measure the quality of information, 
which only measures the association between reported information and market value. 
Future studies could use other proxies for accounting information quality such as the 
level of earnings management, timely loss recognition and persistence and accruals 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  
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APPENDIX A  
DISCLOSURE INDEX 
Code Items Description  
1.0 Human capital Intellectual capital component 
1.1 Board of directors Sub-category  
1.1.1 Photos and ages of 
directors 
Photos or/and biological age of directors. The 
information provides information users some first 
impressions of firm’s directors. 
1.1.2 Backgrounds of 
directors 
Educational background or/and work experience.   The 
item measures directors’ knowledge and skills. 
1.1.3 Comments on 
directors 
It refers to the general discussion of board structure, 
directors’ work-related competence, achievement, etc. 
1.2 Top management Sub-category 
1.2.4 Members of top 
management 
It refers names, photos, and/or age of top managers. 
1.2.5 Backgrounds of top 
management 
Educational background or/and work experience of top 
managers. 
1.2.6 Comments on top 
management 
Comments on the abilities of top management team. 
1.3 Employees Sub-category 
1.3.7 Employee statistics General discussion of employee structures such as 
employee count, employee diversity (e.g. ethnicity, 
gender, etc), employee breakdown by departments, 
segments, seniority, etc.   
1.3.8 Changes in 
employee structure 
Description of changes in employee structure and/or 
reasons for the changes. 
1.3.9 Comments on 
employees 
Comments on employees structure, abilities, 
flexibilities, etc.  
1.3.10 Training policy It includes disclosure such as training policies, 
programmes, and expected outcomes. The quality of 
training policy and activities enhance the capabilities of 
employees. 
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Code Items Description (continued) 
1.3.11 Training activities It refers detailed activities reflecting training policies, 
employee involvements, training costs and results. The 
purpose of 1.3.10 and 1.3.11 is to differentiate the 
degree of disclosure regarding training. 
1.3.12 Recruitment This item refers to recruitment policies, selection 
process, etc. The recruitment process guarantees the 
work-related competence of employees. 
1.3.13 Health and safety 
policies 
Description and discussion of health and safety policies 
and issues. 
1.3.14 Employee 
motivations 
It includes description of financial incentive system (e.g. 
remuneration contract, opportunities) and other non-
financial incentives (e.g. life-work balance, working 
environment, equality).  
1.3.15 Employee 
communication 
Statements of employee communication policy (e.g. 
process of understanding employee satisfaction).    
1.4 Other Sub-category 
1.4.16 Other disclosure It refers to other disclosure of human capital information 
(e.g. special display such as interview of corporate 
personnel).  
2.0 Relational capital Intellectual capital component 
2.1 Customer relations Sub-category 
2.1.17 General description General description of customer relations (e.g. current 
relationship with customers, discussion of product 
demand, etc.). 
2.1.18 Identification of 
customer groups 
Discussion of targeted customer groups (e.g. size, 
location, key customers, contracts, etc.). 
2.1.19 Customer relation 
maintenance 
It refers to strategies to maintain current customers such 
as improvement of customer services and quality of 
products. Policies of post-purchase relations 
maintenance such as warranty and guarantee are also 
included. 
2.1.20 Acquisition of new 
customers 
Description of company’s plans, strategies, activities on 
acquiring new or more customers.  
2.1.21 Customer feedback It refers to companies’ efforts on communicating with 
customers (e.g. customer satisfaction). It does not 
include the feedbacks related to R&D output (see 
3.4.54). 
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Code Items Description (continued) 
2.2 Supplier relations Sub-category 
2.2.22 Supplier relations General discussion of supply relations. 
2.2.23 Leading suppliers Lists of key suppliers, description of transactions details 
with key suppliers (e.g. payment terms). 
2.2.24 Comments on 
suppliers 
Comments on suppliers and future planning on 
maintaining supplier relations. 
2.3 Investor relations Sub-category 
2.3.25 Investor relations Discussion of investor relations including 
communication methods with investors. 
2.4  Strategic alliance Sub-category 
2.4.26 Partnerships Description of business collaborations and partnerships 
(including the purpose of collaborations). 
2.4.27 Comments on 
partnerships 
Comments on partnerships including comments on 
partners, outcome of partnerships (e.g. effectiveness and 
efficiency of collaborations).  
2.4.28 Favourite contracts Description of favourite contracts and favourable 
relationships. 
2.4.29 Comments on 
favourite contracts 
Discussion the expected or actual outcome of favourite 
contracts. 
2.5 Other stakeholders Sub-category 
2.5.30 Other stakeholders It refers to the relationship with other stakeholders 
which are not covered by customer, supplier, investor, 
business partner relations as well as 2.5.31 and 2.5.32 
(e.g. government, competitors). 
2.5.31 Social policies Description of company’s relationship with local 
communities. 
2.5.32 Environmental 
policies 
Statement of environmental policies and activities.  
2.6 Marketing Sun-category 
2.6.33 Market reputation 
and presence 
Statement of company image/reputation and description 
of geographical location/market segmentation. This item 
describes a firm’s leadership in the market. 
2.6.34 Brand and 
specialisation 
This item describes companies’ competitive advantages.    
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Code Items Description (continued) 
2.6.35 Awards and 
achievements 
Lists of company’s awards and achievements. It reflects 
market recognition of company’s leadership position 
and competitive advantages. 
2.6.36 Advertising and 
promotion 
The item describes companies’ efforts on improving 
market recognition.  
2.6.37 New services It refers new/wider services offered by acquiring new 
businesses or expanding the original businesses (new 
branches), new products (excluding new products 
developed from R&D process, which is covered in 
3.4.53). 
3.0 Structural capital Intellectual capital component 
3.1 Intellectual property  (IP) Sub-category 
3.1.38 Lists of IP Lists of all intellectual properties (e.g. special rights, 
trademarks, etc.).  
3.1.39 Features of IP Discussion on main features and benefits of IP. It does 
not include mandatory quantitative disclosure required 
by the standards.  
3.1.40 Internal generated 
IP 
Details of internal generated IP. 
3.2 Information 
technology system 
(IT) Sub-category 
3.2.41 IT system General description of company’s software and 
hardware (e.g. name and function of IT system). 
3.2.42 Breakdown of IT 
costs 
Other information relating to IT (e.g. detailed 
breakdown of IT costs including training and other 
related costs). Mandatory disclosure of total IT costs as 
a whole does not considered as detailed information.  
3.2.43 Online management 
and trading 
Description of online management and trading, 
maintenance, training and other related disclosure. 
3.2.44 Investment in IT Statement on IT investment strategy, planning and 
activities.  
3.3 Management 
process 
Sub-category 
3.3.45 Corporate 
philosophy 
Statement of organisational culture, value, vision and 
core purpose. 
3.3.46 Information and 
knowledge sharing  
Description of internal and external sharing knowledge 
and information. 
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Code Items Description (continued) 
3.3.47 Flexibilities and 
organisation 
learning 
Flexibilities refers to company’s ability to face 
challenges (e.g. economic recession, financial 
difficulties, etc.) and changes (e.g. changes in customer 
spending behaviour); Organisation learning includes the 
abilities of a company learn from past experience, 
feedback and failures.   
3.4 Research and 
development 
(R&D) Sub-category 
3.4.48 General discussion 
of R&D activities 
The discussion includes policy, strategies and/or 
objectives of R&D activities as well as competitors’ 
information. 
3.4.49 R&D investment Discussion of R&D spending, investment intensity 
and/or other costing information.  Mandatory disclosure 
does not include in the item. 
3.4.50 R&D centres and 
research partnership 
Discussion of available R&D centres and research 
partnerships. 
3.4.51 R&D activities Description of current R&D activities.  
3.4.52 Future prospects of 
R&D 
Statement on future planning, strategies, activities 
regarding  R&D. 
3.4.53 R&D output Description of R&D output such as new products or new 
methods. 
3.4.54 Feedback Feedback of R&D output (e.g. customer satisfaction, 
sales volume). The item only refers to the feedback 
related to R&D output. General feedback is scored 
under 2.1.21. 
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APPENDIX B 
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
“High-tech” industries “Low-tech” industries 
Automobile and components Commercial services and supplies 
Banks Consumer durables and apparels 
Capital goods Consumer services 
Commercial services and supplies Energy 
Consumer services Food, beverage and tobacco 
Diversified financials Food staples and retailing 
Health care equipment and services Materials 
Insurance Retail 
Media Transportation 
Pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life sciences Utilities 
Real estate  
Semi-conductors and semi-conductors equipment  
Software and services  
Technology, hardware and equipment  
Telecommunication services  
 
Whiting and Woodcock’s (2011) modified GISC framework 
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APPENDIX C SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Table 12 Robust model for the level of intellectual capital 
Variables Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics 
 Total IC score Human capital Relational capital Structural capital 
Intercept -0.298* -5.95 -0.602* -8.80 -0.323* -4.84 0.019 0.36 
Brdsize 0.017* 3.98 0.015** 2.18 0.026* 4.49 0.009** 2.23 
Brdindp 0.159* 5.84 0.193* 4.51 0.190* 5.11 0.089* 3.54 
Brdfemale 0.043 0.94 0.039 0.64 0.096 1.41 -0.020 -0.54 
OC 0.278* 2.93 0.487* 3.31 0.389* 2.75 -0.055 -0.52 
OC2 -0.333** -2.35 -0.516** -2.10 -0.478** -2.08 0.019 0.11 
Firm Size 0.014* 4.62 0.030* 7.25 0.013* 3.08 -0.001 -0.22 
Leverage 0.006 0.85 -0.004 -0.17 0.018  0.63 0.001 0.19 
Profitability -0.000 -0.08 0.000 0.22 -0.000 -0.08 -0.000 -0.54 
Listing Age 0.000 0.76 0.001 1.16 -0.000 -0.05 0.000 0.90 
Industries 0.007 0.60 0.033** 1.92 -0.018 -1.16 0.013 1.13 
Intstatus -0.004 -0.23 -0.028 -1.15 -0.002 -0.10 0.016 1.01 
         
No. of obs. 450  450  450  450  
𝑅2 0.259  0.2881  0.236  0.061  
F-value 13.24  18.45  11.63  2.51  
F sig. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  
Note:  
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13 Robust model for the value relevance of intellectual capital disclosure 
Variables Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics 
 Total IC score Human capital Relational capital Structural capital 
Intercept -1.618  -1.29 -1.448 -1.39 -2.031 -1.51 -3.284* -2.63 
E 1.717*** 1,69 1.685*** 1.66 1.743*** 1.69 1.744*** 1.67 
BV 1.154* 8.17 1.128* 8.47 1.159* 8.00 1.153* 7.91 
IC -7.242** -1.90 -7.338** -2.36 -4.387 -1.47 -1.852 -0.51 
Firmsize 0.090 1.51 0.105*** 1.70 0.085 1.41 0.096** 1.53 
Lev 0.289 0.39 0.273 0.37 0.294** 0.38 0.297** 0.37 
Industries 0.498** 2.91 0.448* 2.59 0.519* 2.97 0.557* 3.01 
Brdsize -0.131 -1.06 -0.166 -1.50 -0.058 -0.40 0.016 0.19 
Brdindp -0.090 -0.11 -0.245 -0.34 -0.000 -0.00 1.137*** 1.77 
Brdfemale 2.21*** 1.95 1.769** 2.02 2.240** 2.41 2.198** 2.21 
OC 2.283 0.78 1.882 0.86 2.434 0.85 2.573  1.28 
OC2 -4.493 -0.96 -3.417 -1.01 -4.463 -0.95 -4.786  -1.50 
Brdsize*IC 0.925** 2.91 0.859* 2.85 0.516 1.39 0.591 1.23 
Brdindp*IC 4.915  1.49 4.893** 2.02 3.992 1.56 -0.688 -0.19 
Brdfemale*IC -3.241 -0.42 -0.861 -0.19 -2.788 -0.49 -4.592 -0.46 
OC*IC -6.527 -0.50 -4.497 -0.52 -5.388 -0.53 -8.746 -0.78 
OC2*IC 9.754 0.48 3.779 0.29 7.162 0.44 15.487 0.92 
         
No. of obs. 444  444  444  444  
𝑅2 0.827  0.830  0.826  0.824  
F-value 25.94  28.64  26.34  18.15  
F sig. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note:  
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
